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PANEL I: TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE 
EUROPEAN UNION 
 
PRINCIPAL PAPERS 
 
THE POST-DEREGULATORY 
LANDSCAPE IN  
INTERNATIONAL 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW:  
A UNIQUE EUROPEAN UNION 
APPROACH? 
Herbert Burkert* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This Article has two purposes: the first is to provide an over-
view of the developments in telecommunications sector specific 
regulation before and after the so called “Telecommunications 
Review 1999” (“1999 Communications Review”) of the Euro-
pean Union (“EU” or “European”), with an emphasis on the 
“new regulatory package” that has evolved from this review. 
After a brief overview of the “constitutional” basis for EU ac-
tivities in the field of telecom regulation and the regulatory 
toolbox available in Part II, a presentation of the key elements 
of EU telecom law until the 1999 Communications Review will 
follow in Part III, as well as a description of the main issues of 
that Review and the consequences as expressed in (the current 
state of) the new regulatory package.  It should be noted that 
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this post-deregulatory landscape in the EU has not fully 
emerged yet. One element of the original package has already 
been put into operation: Regulation 2887/2000 of the European 
Parliament (“Parliament”) and of the Council of the European 
Union (“Council”) of 18 December 2000 on Unbundled Access to 
the Local Loop.1 The finalization of the remaining elements of 
the package is envisaged for Spring 2002. The Member States 
will be obliged to transform the package into national law by 
2003.  Due to this situation, this Article, when reporting on the 
full package, will focus principally on the stage of all proposals 
as first presented by the European Commission (“Commission”) 
in 2000. Where appropriate, however, reference will be made to 
changes which occurred after the Commission reconsidered its 
proposals following the First Reading in the Parliament. While 
this approach does not fully reflect the state of affairs at the 
time of writing, this Article will at least provide the reader 
with a timeline which can be used at a later stage to make a 
full comparison of the original package with the final outcome. 
The second purpose of this Article is to invite — with the 
benefit of hindsight, a benefit that should never be left unex-
ploited — another view on these developments: Statements of 
the main political actors on past regulatory activities tend to 
convey the impression that regardless of any past changes, 
each of the previous stages had always been under control and 
an inherent logic had always been at work at every step in the 
process. Part IV begs to differ from such logification by select-
ing two issues for closer scrutiny: the “European Regulatory 
Authority” that hovers through these regulatory changes like 
the “ghost of Christmas yet to come”2 and the revival of the 
“public service” concept. It is suggested that rather than being 
the consequential outcome of a market-logical sequence of de-
regulation and re-regulation — some of the changes appear to 
be the result of an unpredicted interplay of forces outside tele-
communications regulation, forces which will continue to 
thwart econocratic regulatory intentions.  
  
 1. Parliament and Council Regulation 2887/2000 of 18 December 2000 on 
Unbundled Access to the Local Loop, 2000 O.J. (L 336) 4 [hereinafter Parlia-
ment and Council Regulation 2887/2000]. 
 2. See CHARLES DICKENS , A CHRISTMAS CAROL (1st ed., Barron’s 1985) 
(1843). 
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Whether the results — and the results of this regulatory en-
deavor are not yet evident — will be very much different from 
the results once intended is not the point at issue here. The 
Article seeks only to provide examples demonstrating that, for 
the purpose of comparing regulatory policies in the EU, the 
historical, institutional, political and cultural factors in the 
regulatory environment in the EU are so important that a very 
general level of abstraction is needed to make comparison with 
other regulatory regimes meaningful. There is sufficient insti-
tutional economics and political science analysis available to 
offer appropriate explanations of such “path dependency” and 
“institutional constraints.”  However, this Article also tries to 
convey that such influences should not solely be seen as hin-
drance, constraints or obstacles to the virtuous path of regula-
tion, but as potent and delicious flavors of regulatory culture.3 
The new regulatory package will be the focus of our attention 
in tracing the influence of these “soft” framework conditions. 
Clearly, for a complete understanding of the regulatory envi-
ronment, both competition law and sector specific regulation 
must be considered together. Further, recent developments in 
competition law have to be taken into account, particularly be-
cause of their influence on the specific sector regulation.4  Due 
attention will be given to these influences.  While there is still 
a debate as to whether competition law will eventually replace 
sector specific regulation in telecommunications, there is a ba-
sic understanding that sector specific regulation for the time 
being is still necessary and the new regulatory package is ma-
terial proof of this belief.   
  
 3. On such a “constraints” and “path” oriented comparison between the 
U.S. and EU approaches, albeit restricted to the area of rate rebalancing, see 
Barbara A. Cherry & Johannes M. Bauer, Institutional Arrangements and 
Rate Rebalancing: Empirical Evidence from the United States and Europe, 
Paper Presented at the Thirteenth Biennial Conference of the International 
Telecommunications Society (July 2-5, 2000), available at 
http://www.its2000.org.ar/conference/cherry_bauer.pdf. 
 4. See Commission Working Document on Proposed New Regulatory 
Framework for Electronic Communications Networks and Services: Draft 
Guidelines on Market Analysis and the Calculation of Significant Market 
Power under Article 14 of the Proposed Directive on a Common Regulatory 
Framework for Electronic Communications Networks and Services, 
COM(01)175 final [hereinafter Commission Working Document on Proposed 
New Regulatory Framework]. 
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Since the early beginnings, not only EU telecommunications 
law, but EU law, EU institutions and even the terminology of 
the EU as such have been (and continue to be) subject to con-
stant change. Therefore, the following terminological clarifica-
tions may be useful: 
(1) “EU” in this Article identifies what in correct terminology 
is the “European Community” (“EC” or “Community”), i.e., the 
first pillar of the three pillar structure of the EU introduced 
with the Treaty on European Union (“TEU”) — Maastricht 
Treaty — in force since November 1, 1993.5 The other two pil-
lars are the common foreign and security policy and the coop-
eration in the fields of justice and home affairs.  
(2) The primary legal source for EU telecommunication law 
is the Treaty Establishing the European Community (“EC 
Treaty”).6 This treaty was last amended by the Treaty of Am-
sterdam, which came into force on May 1, 1999.7 Among other 
things, the Treaty of Amsterdam changed the numbering of the 
EC Treaty.  To avoid confusion, this Article will refer to the EC 
Treaty using the post-Amsterdam numbering system, even in 
cases of pre-Amsterdam applications. 
II. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF EU ACTIVITIES 
A. The Constitutional Framework for Telecommunications 
The EU institutions draw their regulatory and policy making 
power from the treaties as their primary source of legitimacy. 
The EC Treaty provides several references to telecommunica-
tions: (1) Articles 154 to 156, introduced in the Maastricht 
Treaty as Article 129(b)-(d), explicitly refer to telecommunica-
tions policy goals under the heading of “Trans-European Net-
works;”8 and 
  
 5. TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. (C 191) 1 (1992). 
 6. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Nov. 10, 1997, O.J. 
(C 340) 3 (1997) [hereinafter EC TREATY]. 
 7. TREATY OF AMSTERDAM AMENDING THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, 
THE TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AND CERTAIN 
RELATED ACTS, Oct. 2, 1997, O.J. (C 340) 1 (1997) [hereinafter TREATY OF 
AMSTERDAM].  The Treaty of Amsterdam also contained changes of the TEU. 
 8. The text of Article 154 states:    
 
1.  To help achieve the objectives referred to in Articles 14 and 158 
and to enable citizens of the Union, economic operators and regional 
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and local communities to derive full benefit from the setting-up of an 
area without internal frontiers, the Community shall contribute to 
the establishment and development of trans-European networks in 
the areas of transport, telecommunications and energy infrastruc-
tures.  
2.  Within the framework of a system of open and competitive 
markets, action by the Community shall aim at promoting the inter-
connection and interoperability of national networks as well as ac-
cess to such networks.  It shall take account in particular of the need 
to link island, landlocked and peripheral regions with the central re-
gions of the Community. 
EC TREATY art. 154.  Article 155 states: 
 
In order to achieve the objectives referred to in Article 154, the 
Community:  
-- shall establish a series of guidelines covering the objectives, pri-
orities and broad lines of measures envisaged in the sphere of trans-
European networks; these guidelines shall identify projects of com-
mon interest;  
-- shall implement any measures that may prove necessary to en-
sure the interoperability of the networks, in particular in the field of 
technical standardisation;  
-- may support projects of common interest supported by Member 
States, which are identified in the framework of the guidelines re-
ferred to in the first indent, particularly through feasibility studies, 
loan guarantees or interest-rate subsidies; the Community may also 
contribute, through the Cohesion Fund set up pursuant to Article 
161, to the financing of specific projects in Member States in the 
area of transport infrastructure.  
The Community’s activities shall take into account the potential 
economic viability of the projects.  
2.  Member States shall, in liaison with the Commission, coordi-
nate among themselves the policies pursued at national level which 
may have a significant impact on the achievement of the objectives 
referred to in Article 154.  The Commission may, in close cooperation 
with the Member State, take any useful initiative to promote such 
coordination.  
3.  The Community may decide to cooperate with third countries 
to promote projects of mutual interest and to ensure the interopera-
bility of networks. 
Id. art. 155.  Article 156 states: 
 
The guidelines and other measures referred to in Article 155(1) shall 
be adopted by the Council, acting in accordance with the procedure 
referred to in Article 251 and after consulting the Economic and So-
cial Committee and the Committee of the Regions.  
Guidelines and projects of common interest which relate to the terri-
tory of a Member State shall require the approval of the Member 
State concerned. 
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(2) Article 157 seconds these objectives on a more general 
level.9  
The main regulatory instruments, however, have been the 
articles referring to: (1) liberalization — Article 86 (ex Article 
90);10 (2) harmonization — Article 95 (ex Article 100a);11 and  
  
Id. art. 156. 
 9. The text of Article 157 is: 
 
1.  The Community and the Member States shall ensure that the 
conditions necessary for the competitiveness of the Community’s in-
dustry exist.  
For that purpose, in accordance with a system of open and com-
petitive markets, their action shall be aimed at:  
-- speeding up the adjustment of industry to structural changes;  
-- encouraging an environment favourable to initiative and to the 
development of undertakings throughout the Community, particu-
larly small and medium-sized undertakings;  
-- encouraging an environment favourable to cooperation between 
undertakings;  
-- fostering better exploitation of the industrial potential of poli-
cies of innovation, research and technological development.  
2.  The Member States shall consult each other in liaison with the 
Commission and, where necessary, shall coordinate their action.  
The Commission may take any useful initiative to promote such co-
ordination.  
3.  The Community shall contribute to the achievement of the ob-
jectives set out in paragraph 1 through the policies and activities it 
pursues under other provisions of this Treaty.  The Council, acting 
unanimously on a proposal from the Commission, after consulting 
the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee, 
may decide on specific measures in support of action taken in the 
Member States to achieve the objectives set out in paragraph 1.  
This Title shall not provide a basis for the introduction by the 
Community of any measure which could lead to a distortion of com-
petition. 
Id. art. 157. 
 10. Article 86 states:    
 
1.  In the case of public undertakings and undertakings to which 
Member States grant special or exclusive rights, Member States 
shall neither enact nor maintain in force any measure contrary to 
the rules contained in this Treaty, in particular to those rules pro-
vided for in Article 12 and Articles 81 to 89.  
2.  Undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of gen-
eral economic interest or having the character of a revenue-
producing monopoly shall be subject to the rules contained in this 
Treaty, in particular to the rules on competition, insofar as the ap-
plication of such rules does not obstruct the performance, in law or in 
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fact, of the particular tasks assigned to them.  The development of 
trade must not be affected to such an extent as would be contrary to 
the interests of the Community.  
3.  The Commission shall ensure the application of the provisions 
of this Article and shall, where necessary, address appropriate direc-
tives or decisions to Member States. 
Id. art. 86. 
 11. Article 95 states:    
 
1.  By way of derogation from Article 94 and save where otherwise 
provided in this Treaty, the following provisions shall apply for the 
achievement of the objectives set out in Article 14.  The Council 
shall, acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 
251 and after consulting the Economic and Social Committee, adopt 
the measures for the approximation of the provisions laid down by 
law, regulation or administrative action in Member States which 
have as their object the establishment and functioning of the inter-
nal market.  
2.  Paragraph 1 shall not apply to fiscal provisions, to those relat-
ing to the free movement of persons nor to those relating to the 
rights and interests of employed persons.  
3.  The Commission, in its proposals envisaged in paragraph 1 
concerning health, safety, environmental protection and consumer 
protection, will take as a base a high level of protection, taking ac-
count in particular of any new development based on scientific facts.  
Within their respective powers, the European Parliament and the 
Council will also seek to achieve this objective.  
4.  If, after the adoption by the Council or by the Commission of a 
harmonisation measure, a Member State deems it necessary to 
maintain national provisions on grounds of major needs referred to 
in Article 30, or relating to the protection of the environment or the 
working environment, it shall notify the Commission of these provi-
sions as well as the grounds for maintaining them.  
5.  Moreover, without prejudice to paragraph 4, if, after the adop-
tion by the Council or by the Commission of a harmonisation meas-
ure, a Member State deems it necessary to introduce national provi-
sions based on new scientific evidence relating to the protection of 
the environment or the working environment on grounds of a prob-
lem specific to that Member State arising after the adoption of the 
harmonisation measure, it shall notify the Commission of the envis-
aged provisions as well as the grounds for introducing them.  
6.  The Commission shall, within six months of the notifications as 
referred to in paragraphs 4 and 5, approve or reject the national pro-
visions involved after having verified whether or not they are a 
means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade 
between Member States and whether or not they shall constitute an 
obstacle to the functioning of the internal market.  In the absence of 
a decision by the Commission within this period the national provi-
sions referred to in paragraphs 4 and 5 shall be deemed to have been 
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(3) the arsenal of competition regulation — Articles 81-89 (ex 
Articles 85 - 94).12 
  
approved.  When justified by the complexity of the matter and in the 
absence of danger for human health, the Commission may notify the 
Member State concerned that the period referred to in this para-
graph may be extended for a further period of up to six months.  
7.  When, pursuant to paragraph 6, a Member State is authorised 
to maintain or introduce national provisions derogating from a har-
monisation measure, the Commission shall immediately examine 
whether to propose an adaptation to that measure.  
8.  When a Member State raises a specific problem on public 
health in a field which has been the subject of prior harmonisation 
measures, it shall bring it to the attention of the Commission which 
shall immediately examine whether to propose appropriate meas-
ures to the Council.  
9.  By way of derogation from the procedure laid down in Articles 
226 and 227, the Commission and any Member State may bring the 
matter directly before the Court of Justice if it considers that an-
other Member State is making improper use of the powers provided 
for in this Article.  
10.  The harmonisation measures referred to above shall, in ap-
propriate cases, include a safeguard clause authorising the Member 
States to take, for one or more of the non-economic reasons referred 
to in Article 30, provisional measures subject to a Community con-
trol procedure. 
Id. art. 95. 
 12. Article 81 states:     
 
1.  The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the 
common market: all agreements between undertakings, decisions by 
associations of undertakings and concerted practices which may af-
fect trade between Member States and which have as their object or 
effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within 
the common market, and in particular those which:  
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other 
trading conditions;  
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or 
investment;  
(c) share markets or sources of supply;  
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with 
other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disad-
vantage;  
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the 
other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or 
according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject 
of such contracts.  
2.  Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this Arti-
cle shall be automatically void.  
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3.  The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be declared inap-
plicable in the case of:  
-- any agreement or category of agreements between undertak-
ings;  
-- any decision or category of decisions by associations of under-
takings;  
-- any concerted practice or category of concerted practices, which 
contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to 
promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers 
a fair share of the resulting benefit, and which does not:  
(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are 
not indispensable to the attainment of these objectives;  
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating compe-
tition in respect of a substantial part of the products in question. 
EC TREATY art. 81.  Article 82 states: 
 
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position 
within the common market or in a substantial part of it shall be pro-
hibited as incompatible with the common market insofar as it may 
affect trade between Member States.  
Such abuse may, in particular, consist in:  
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices 
or other unfair trading conditions;  
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the 
prejudice of consumers;  
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with 
other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disad-
vantage;  
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the 
other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or 
according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject 
of such contracts. 
Id. art. 82.  Article 83 states: 
 
1.  The appropriate regulations or directives to give effect to the 
principles set out in Articles 81 and 82 shall be laid down by the 
Council, acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Com-
mission and after consulting the European Parliament.  
2.  The regulations or directives referred to in paragraph 1 shall 
be designed in particular:  
(a) to ensure compliance with the prohibitions laid down in Article 
81(1) and in Article 82 by making provision for fines and periodic 
penalty payments;  
(b) to lay down detailed rules for the application of Article 81(3), 
taking into account the need to ensure effective supervision on the 
one hand, and to simplify administration to the greatest possible ex-
tent on the other;  
(c) to define, if need be, in the various branches of the economy, 
the scope of the provisions of Articles 81 and 82;  
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As stated above, the competition law instruments are men-
tioned here for the sake of completeness.  This Article will focus 
on the use of the liberalization and harmonization instruments.  
The main institutional agents involved in EU regulation and 
policy making are the Commission, the Council and the Par-
liament. The Commission is the main initiator of regulation 
and oversees the enforcement of the treaties. The Member 
States of the EU are represented in the Council. Since 1979, 
the Parliament is directly elected in the Member States accord-
ing to their election rules. The Parliament has increasingly re-
ceived co-decision power by the various changes to the treaties. 
With the Treaty of Amsterdam, the Parliament can now be re-
garded as co-legislator together with the Council.13 With the 
appointment of the President of the Commission being subject 
to Parliament’s approval, Parliament has also gained more 
  
(d) to define the respective functions of the Commission and of the 
Court of Justice in applying the provisions laid down in this para-
graph;  
(e) to determine the relationship between national laws and the 
provisions contained in this Section or adopted pursuant to this Arti-
cle.  
Id. art. 83.  Article 84 states: 
 
Until the entry into force of the provisions adopted in pursuance 
of Article 83, the authorities in Member States shall rule on the ad-
missibility of agreements, decisions and concerted practices and on 
abuse of a dominant position in the common market in accordance 
with the law of their country and with the provisions of Article 81, in 
particular paragraph 3, and of Article 82.  
Id. art. 84.  Article 85 states: 
 
1.  Without prejudice to Article 84, the Commission shall ensure 
the application of the principles laid down in Articles 81 and 82.  On 
application by a Member State or on its own initiative, and in coop-
eration with the competent authorities in the Member States, who 
shall give it their assistance, the Commission shall investigate cases 
of suspected infringement of these principles.  If it finds that there 
has been an infringement, it shall propose appropriate measures to 
bring it to an end.  
2.  If the infringement is not brought to an end, the Commission 
shall record such infringement of the principles in a reasoned deci-
sion.  The Commission may publish its decision and authorise Mem-
ber States to take the measures, the conditions and details of which 
it shall determine, needed to remedy the situation. 
Id. art. 85. 
 13. See TREATY OF AMSTERDAM , arts. J.11, K.17, 109q & 12o. 
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weight in its relationship to the Commission.14 As we shall see, 
this gradual shift of power has significant effects on the way 
telecommunications regulation evolved. 
B. The Regulatory Toolbox 
Liberalization, harmonization and checks on competition de-
scribe the functional objectives of the instruments of Commu-
nity law that are available to the EU institutions. 
1. Liberalization 
Liberalization measures have been based on EC Treaty Arti-
cle 86 (ex Article 90). National telecommunications operators 
were among those undertakings which had been granted spe-
cial and exclusive rights in the general economic interest. For a 
long time, their role was not questioned, although the EC 
Treaty had made it clear that such undertakings could pose 
competition problems in the EU market.15 However, Article 86 
also confirmed that such undertakings enjoyed possibilities for 
exemption if necessary to enable those undertakings to perform 
the particular tasks assigned to them.16 But this exemption 
itself was subject to an exemption: the Commission has to act 
when and where necessary to ensure, by decisions and/or direc-
tives, that this exemption in turn is guided only by the re-
quirements of the particular tasks assigned to the undertak-
ings, or is based on particular aspects of general economic in-
terest accepted in the context of the EC Treaty (like public 
health and safety, which already permit exemption from the 
free movement of goods and services), and that the exemption 
does not disrupt trade to an extent that would be contrary to 
the Community’s interests.17 
  
 14. For a concise description of these developments, see KLEMENS H.  
FISCHER, THE EUROPEAN UNION: A COMPACT GUIDE FOR BUSINESS-
GOVERNMENT-RELATIONS  62-63 (2001); Europarl, Fact Sheets, at 
http://www.europarl.eu.int/factsheets/default_en.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 
2002) [hereinafter Fact Sheets]. 
 15. See EC TREATY art. 86. 
 16. Such a derogation was explicitly given to voice telephony.  See Com-
mission Directive 90/388 of 28 June 1990 on Competition in the Markets for 
Telecommunications Services, 1990 O.J. (L 192) 10 [hereinafter Commission 
Directive 90/388].  
 17. See EC TREATY art. 86. 
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When the Commission started to intervene on this legal basis 
in the area of telecommunications, it immediately created a 
source of conflict among EU institutions and with the Member 
States. We will briefly look at these conflicts when we describe 
the situation before the 1999 Communications Review. How-
ever, in preview of some of the final observations of this Article, 
it may be observed that Commission policy gradually seems to 
re-emphasize aspects of public interest and public service, 
again not without consequences for telecommunications regula-
tion.  
2. Harmonization 
“Harmonization” according to EC Treaty Article 95 (ex Arti-
cle 100a) had been the traditional good for everything method. 
The Article allows for approximation of regulatory mechanisms 
(not only laws) in the Member States as long as such approxi-
mation serves the EU market, unless other provisions are more 
directly applicable. The harmonization effort, however, has to 
be the main thrust of the proposed measure.18  
3. Competition 
The traditional competition law instruments are general in-
struments of market (re)balance directed at undertakings. 
Since the focus of this Article is the specific telecommunica-
tions law landscape created by the EU for the Member States, 
these measures are described here only to complete the picture. 
There are, however, overlaps: overlaps of competence between 
general competition authorities and specific telecommunica-
tions regulatory authorities and overlaps of definition for inter-
vention thresholds. As we shall see, sector specific regulatory 
activities in telecommunications have attempted to address 
some of these problems. There are three instruments which the 
Commission uses to ensure and maintain competition: (1) ac-
  
 18. See Case C-187/93, Parliament v. Council, 1994 E.C.R. I-2857; Case C-
155/91, Commission v. Council, 1993 E.C.R. I-939.  For further comments, see 
PIERRE LAROUCHE , COMPETITION LAW AND REGULATION IN EUROPEAN 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS  408 (2000).   
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tion against concerted practices; (2) action against abuses of 
dominant positions; and (3) investigations into mergers.19 
In the context of telecommunications, the bases for actions 
against concerted practices are EC Treaty Articles 3(g), 81, 83, 
84 and 85 (ex Articles 85, 87, 88 and 89).20 These actions are 
governed by the prohibition principle of Article 81(1) and (2) 
which states that all agreements between undertakings (in-
cluding associations and concerted practices) that may affect 
trade between Member States are prohibited and void.21  
Article 81(3) is an exemption to this principle and relates to 
agreements which are deemed to have positive effects on the 
economy, such as agreements that improve the production or 
distribution of goods or promote technical or economic progress. 
These agreements, however, have to show direct benefits for 
the consumers as well, and they may not impose unnecessary 
restrictions or aim to eliminate competition for a substantial 
part of the products concerned.22 
The Commission intervenes according to Council Regulation 
17/62 of 6 February 1962 (based on EC Treaty Article 83) - with 
various later amendments. The Commission finds infringe-
ments and may impose fines and penalty payments. Damages 
to third parties may be granted, but only by national courts, 
whereas penalties and fines may also be charged by national 
competition authorities. The Commission may also grant what 
is known as a “negative clearance,” i.e., provide a certificate to 
an undertaking that its agreements are not in conflict with the 
prohibition principle. In addition, the Commission may grant 
individual exemptions. There is also the widely used possibility 
of an “en bloc negative clearance” for certain typical agree-
ments in specific areas.23 
  
 19. There are other measures – against state aid – used to ensure compe-
tition, however, they are not directly relevant here.  See, e.g. , EC TREATY  arts. 
87-89. 
 20. See Fact Sheets , supra note 14, at pt. 3, ch. 3.1. 
 21. EC TREATY art. 81(1)-(2).  
 22. Id. art. 81(3). 
 23. See, e.g., Council Regulation 19/65 of 2 March 1965 on Application of 
Article 85(3) of the Treaty to Certain Categories of Agreements and Con-
certed Practices, 1965-1966 O.J. SPEC. ED. 35; Council Regulation 2821/71 of 
20 December 1971 on Application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to Categories 
of Agreements, Decisions and Concerted Practices, 1971 O.J. SPEC. ED. (L 
285) 49; Council Regulation 1215/99 of 10 June 1999 Amending Regulation 
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Even if there is an infringement, the Commission will not act 
in cases of minor importance. This de minimis principle not 
only reduces the workload, but also tends to favor small and 
medium sized enterprises. The threshold for agreements which 
fall under the scrutiny of the Commission is a market share of 
10% for vertical agreements and 5% for horizontal agreements. 
However, certain activities remain generally prohibited regard-
less of the de minimis rule: price fixing, joint sales offices, pro-
duction or delivery quotas, sharing of markets or supply 
sources in the area of horizontal agreements and fixing the re-
sale price and absolute territorial protection clause as regards 
vertical agreements. All these rules are currently under revi-
sion, independently of the changes in the telecommunications 
regulation sector, aiming at a more flexible and a more decen-
tralized system of competition control.24 
Measures against abuse of a dominant position25 are based 
on EC Treaty Article 82 (ex Article 86).  Abuse of a dominant 
position occurs when the undertaking influences the structure 
of the relevant market or its degree of competition (e.g., impos-
ing unfair prices or unfair trading conditions; limiting produc-
tion, markets or technical development to the detriment of con-
sumers; etc.) throughout the EU market, or at least a substan-
tial part of it.26 Criteria are the nature of the product, substi-
tute products and consumers’ perception. Abuse of a dominant 
position must adversely affect trade between Member States, 
or be likely to do so.27 The Commission may decide to order a 
stop to such abuse, may impose a fine or penalty, or, as the 
case may be, may also issue a “negative clearance” at an under-
taking’s request if it considers that the practice concerned does 
not infringe EU law.28 This system is currently subject to re-
form as well. 
  
19/65 on the Application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to Certain Categories of 
Agreements and Concerted Practices, 1999 O.J. (L 148) 1. 
 24. See Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Implementation of the 
Rules on Competition Laid Down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty and 
Amending Regulations 1017/68, 2988/74, 4056/86 and 3975/87 (“Regulation 
Implementing Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty”), COM(00)582 final. 
 25. See Fact Sheets , supra note 14, at pt. 3, ch. 3.2.  
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
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The rules on abuse of a dominant position imply merger con-
trol as a proactive risk control measure against the imminent 
danger of an abuse of a dominant position.29 A merger occurs 
when a firm acquires exclusive control of another firm or of a 
firm it controlled jointly with another firm, or where several 
firms take control of a firm or create a new one. The Commis-
sion has the power to examine mergers before they occur. The 
Commission will analyze their compatibility with the European 
market by looking at the impact on the relevant market. This 
comprises: (1) defining the relevant product market; (2) defin-
ing the relevant geographic market; and (3) assessing the com-
patibility of the merger with the internal market on the basis 
of the principle of a dominant position. The Commission looks 
at cases if certain thresholds are reached.30  
The main instruments of EU regulatory power are decisions, 
directives and regulations:  
(1) Decisions can be directed at other EU institutions, Mem-
bers States or physical and legal persons;31 
(2) Directives are addressed to Member States. Member 
States have a time span set by the directive in which the objec-
tives of the directive must be transformed into national law. In 
theory, Member States have a certain measure of discretion to 
use the appropriate means to achieve these objectives.32 In-
creasingly, however, directives have become more and more 
  
 29. See Council Regulation 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the Control of 
Concentrations between Undertakings, 1989 O.J. (L 395) 1 [hereinafter 
Council Regulation 4064/89].  It was subsequently amended by Council Regu-
lation 1310/97 of 30 June 1997 Amending Regulation 4064/89 on the Control 
of Concentrations between Undertakings, 1997 O.J. (L 180) 1, which took 
effect on Mar. 1, 1998 [hereinafter Council Regulation 1310/97]. 
 30. The companies concerned have a combined worldwide turnover of at 
least ECU 5 billion; and at least two of the companies concerned have a 
minimum Community-wide turnover of ECU 250 million.  Each of the com-
panies concerned generates no more than two-thirds of its aggregate Com-
munity-wide turnover in one Member State; or the companies have a com-
bined worldwide turnover of more than ECU 2.5 billion and a turnover of 
more than ECU 100 million in each of at least three Member States.  Indi-
vidually, for at least two of the companies concerned, a turnover of more than 
ECU 25 million in each of the three Member States and more than ECU 100 
million in the Community as a whole.  See Council Regulation 1310/97, supra 
note 29, art. 1. 
 31. EC TREATY art. 249. 
 32. Id. 
 4/24/02 6:44:28 PM 
754 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. XXVII:3 
precise to counterbalance occasional reluctance in Member 
States to transform directives appropriately. Directives or ap-
propriate parts of the directives may become directly binding in 
such Member States which have failed to transform the direc-
tive within the given time limit.33 In addition, the Commission 
may start infringement procedures before the European Court 
of Justice (“ECJ”).34 It should be kept in mind that whenever 
reference is made to a directive, it does not effect change di-
rectly, but requires — as indicated by the term “directive” — 
internal national transformation procedures which may or may 
not always fully reflect the objectives of the directive; and  
(3) Regulations are directly applicable in the Member States.  
They directly become part of a Member State’s legal system 
without any further national transformation act.35 
Depending on the subject of regulation, EU institutions act 
separately or in prescribed cooperative procedures. The typical 
instrument of regulation in the telecommunications field is the 
directive. Where such a directive aims at the harmonization of 
the regulatory environment of telecommunications in the 
Member States, the adequate procedure is the “co-decision pro-
cedure.”36 Such regulatory activity is initiated by the Commis-
sion. The proposal goes to the Council and to the First Reading 
  
 33. See, e.g., Case 8/81, Becker v. Finanzamt Münster-Innenstadt, 1982 
E.C.R. 53 (holding that unconditional and precise provisions of a directive 
trump national provisions that are incompatible with the directive). 
 34. See The Court of Justice of the European Communities, Court of Jus-
tice and Court of First Instance: Jurisdiction , at 
http://www.curia.eu.int/en/pres/comp.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2002) [herein-
after ECJ Website].  The ECJ consists of the Court of First Instance (“CFI”) 
and the Court of Justice (“CJ”).  The CJ decides – among other issues – on 
disputes between Member States; and disputes between the EU and Member 
States; disputes between EU institutions; and disputes between individuals 
and the EU.  Id.  It provides opinions on international agreements and pre-
liminary rulings, which help to ensure the uniform interpretation of Commu-
nity law.  Id.  Preliminary rulings are provided in cases where a question of 
law has been referred to the CJ by national courts, which have a case pend-
ing before them for which the answer to that legal question is decisive.  Id.; 
see also EC TREATY art. 234.  The CFI is the court of first instance for (among 
others) disputes between the Community institutions and staff, and for cer-
tain actions brought against the Commission by undertakings or associations 
or individuals.  ECJ Website, supra note 34. CFI judgments can be appealed 
to the CJ only on points of law.  EC TREATY art. 234.   
 35. EC TREATY art. 249. 
 36. Id. art. 251. 
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in Parliament. Depending on the outcome, there will be 
amendments from that First Reading, a “Common Position” 
from the Council and an amended proposal, which then go to a 
Second Reading of the Parliament and, if necessary, into con-
ciliation procedure, or the proposal simply fails.37 
III. THE REGULATORY STORY: BEFORE THE REVIEW, THE 
REVIEW AND AFTER THE REVIEW 
The plot of the following story is very simple: the 1999 Com-
munications Review38 is taken as the watershed for telecom-
munications regulation in Europe. Other historical moments 
would offer themselves as well, such as the full liberalization of 
the European telecommunication markets on January 1, 
1998.39 Emphasizing the 1999 Communications Review also 
implies the danger of overlooking the importance of other EU 
documents which may have carried perhaps a hidden, but nev-
ertheless important meaning for the future course of telecom-
munications regulation. The author will, in the course of this 
Article, argue the importance of both the Green Paper on the 
Convergence of the Telecommunications, Media and Informa-
tion Technology Sectors, and the Implication for Regulation — 
Towards an Information Society (“Green Paper on Conver-
gence”)40 and another paper which normally is not considered 
in direct connection with European telecommunications regula-
tion — the Communication on Services of General Interest in 
Europe.41  It was the 1999 Communications Review, however, 
  
 37. Id. 
 38. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, 
the Council, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the 
Regions: Towards a New Framework for Electronic Communications Infra-
structure and Associated Services: The 1999 Communications Review, 
COM(99)539 final [hereinafter 1999 Communications Review]. 
 39. This is true with the exception of Luxemburg, Spain, Ireland, Portugal 
and Greece, which were granted longer transition periods.  See EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION, STATUS REPORT ON EUROPEAN UNION ELECTRONIC 
COMMUNICATIONS POLICY 40 n.113 (1999), at http://europa.eu.int/ISPO/ info-
soc/telecompolicy/en/tcstatus.pdf. 
 40. Green Paper on the Convergence of the Telecommunications, Media 
and Information Technology Sectors, and the Implications for Regulation: 
Towards an Information Society Approach, COM(97)623 final [hereinafter 
Green Paper on Convergence]. 
 41. Commission Communication on Services of General Interest in 
Europe, 1996 O.J. (C 281) 3 [hereinafter Services of General Interest]. 
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which brought with it the new regulatory package and the de-
sign of the future regulatory landscape, and this is why we take 
it as the turning point. 
A. The State of Telecommunications Regulations Before the 
1999 Communications Review 
1. The Early Beginnings 
EU telecommunications policy began in 1987 with the Green 
Paper — Towards A Dynamic European Economy, Green Paper 
On The Development Of The Common Market For Telecommu-
nications Services And Equipment (“1987 Green Paper”)42 — 
although other authors refer to earlier yet failed beginnings.43 
At that time, the public telecommunications operators (“PTOs”) 
enjoyed national monopolies with regard to both infrastructure 
and services.  In most cases, these operators were owned by the 
state and very often they were also integrated into the admin-
istrative system of that state.44 Nevertheless, there was Euro-
pean cooperation.  In 1959, the Western European countries 
founded, outside the institutional framework of the EU, the 
Conférence Européen des Administrations des Postes et des 
Télécommunications (European Conference of Postal and Tele-
communications Administrations) (“CEPT”) to assist in setting 
standards for transborder electronic communications.45 At that 
time, there had also been failed attempts, now found within the 
framework of the EU, to open at least the internal procurement 
markets of the telecommunications sector. Only in the United 
Kingdom, after the rise of the Thatcher government, did Brit-
ish Telecom turn into an entity separate from the state (al-
though still owned by it at least for a short while), and a com-
petitive network operator, Mercury Communications, was al-
lowed to enter the market.46  
  
 42. Towards a Dynamic European Economy, Green Paper on the Devel-
opment of the Common Market for Telecommunications Services and Equip-
ment, COM(87)290 final [hereinafter The 1987 Green Paper]. 
 43. See ELI NOAM, TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN EUROPE 305-06 (1992). 
 44. LAROUCHE , supra note 18, at 2.  
 45. Radiocommunications Agency, European Conference of Postal and 
Telecommunications Administrations, at http://www.radio.gov.uk/topics 
/international/ceptintro.htm (last visited Apr. 23, 2002). 
 46. See NOAM, supra note 43, at 104. 
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The U.K. had already been the testing ground for a Commis-
sion decision which contained all the drama and curious coali-
tions of power that were to mark the coming changes in tele-
communications regulation in the EU.  In 1982, a Commission 
decision based on EC Treaty Article 82 (ex Article 86) inter-
vened against British Telecom to stop the prevention of service 
companies from forwarding high speed telefax messages be-
tween foreign countries using telephone lines.47 While British 
Telecom, now in its new British environment, accepted that 
decision, the Italian government did not, mainly as its PTO 
was losing money because of the activities of those service com-
panies.  The Italian government brought the case before the 
ECJ, arguing that the Commission had overstepped its compe-
tence.48  The British government also intervened, but on behalf 
of the Commission to uphold the decision. The ECJ ruled in 
favor of the Commission and made it clear that EU competition 
law did apply to those public sector players which dominated 
telecommunications in the Member States.49 This case also 
showed the coming front lines between those Member States 
who were open to change and sided with the Commission, and 
the more reluctant Member States on the other side. 
2. Forces at Play 
Another frontline was soon to become visible in a different 
conflict to be solved by the ECJ: the conflict between the Com-
mission and the Council over legal instruments, where the 
Commission had claimed it could use the liberalization article 
to proceed and open the telecommunications market.50 This 
instrument had no small advantage — the Commission could 
use it alone without formal consent from the Council or the 
Parliament.  
The Parliament, so as not to forget the third institutional 
player, took rather a liberal  view on telecommunications regu-
  
 47. See Günter Knieps, Regulatory Reform of European Telecommunica-
tions: Past Experience and Forward-looking Perspectives, Paper Presented at 
Diskussionsbeiträge des Institut für Verkehrswissenschaft und Regional-
politik (May 2001), available at http://www.vwl.uni-
freiburg.de/fakultaet/vw/disk77.pdf. 
 48. Case 41/83, Italy v. Commission, 1985 E.C.R. 873. 
 49. Id. 
 50. See infra Part III.A.4. 
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latory policy.  As regards the discussion on the appropriate le-
gal instruments, the Parliament sided with the Council’s ap-
proach due, perhaps, to a natural suspicion towards Commis-
sion activities.  In substance, however, the Parliament had also 
already started to worry about the social implications of liber-
alization.51  With increasing power, especially with the intro-
duction of the “co-decision procedure” in the Maastricht Treaty 
in 1993, Parliament became more outspoken on the issue of 
public services and their importance for solidarity and social 
integration in the EU, which did not remain without conse-
quences for the regulatory policies in the telecommunications 
sector.52  
At that time, however, the fronts were not that clearly cut. 
Mark Thatcher refers to a complex pattern of national players 
and their telecommunications policies interwoven with other 
activities on the level of the EU institutions.53 In all Member 
States there was an understanding of the need for change and 
that this change would fundamentally affect the future role of 
PTOs, which in most cases themselves were already open to 
change.54 The main question was timing and the control of tim-
ing, and there was the expectation of receiving gains, perhaps 
in other areas, if one showed a willingness to change.  Govern-
ments could still envisage their national PTOs playing an im-
portant macro-economic role in a liberalized environment while 
cashing in on eventual privatization and harvesting the politi-
cal benefits from an economy revitalized by a more competitive 
telecommunications infrastructure and market.  PTOs, particu-
larly in top management, saw new opportunities to prove their 
management skills which, in their opinion, had been reigned in 
too much and for too long by national administrative think-
ing.55 The PTOs were looking for new sources of capital influx 
in order to become global players.  Even European trade un-
  
 51. LAROUCHE , supra note 18, at 43. 
 52. See THOMAS HART, EUROPÄISCHE TELEKOMMUNIKATIONSPOLITIK : 
ENTWÜRFE FÜR EIN ZUKUNFTSORIENTIERTES REGULIERUNGSKONZEPT 53 n.35 
(1999); LAROUCHE, supra note 18, at 43. 
 53. MARK THATCHER, THE EUROPEANISATION OF REGULATION: THE CASE OF 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS  (European Univ. Inst., Working Paper RSC No. 99/22, 
1999), available at http://www.iue.it/RSC/WP-Texts/99_22t.html (last visited 
Apr. 15, 2002). 
 54. See id. 
 55. See id. 
 4/24/02 6:44:28 PM 
2002] EU TELECOM DEREGULATION  759 
ions, already in the process of fighting their own identity crises, 
could prove themselves reliable agents of change, while at the 
same time seeking advantages for their members and their or-
ganizations before the inevitable settled in. And consumers, the 
“end-end users,” did not feel affected as long as voice telephony 
was not disturbed, and as long as they could get their standard 
services a little faster than before.56 
Furthermore, in all the national negotiations, reference could 
be made to EU negotiations, Commission requirements and 
Council outcomes, thus all the apparent “European necessities” 
helped to accelerate transformation processes. This did not re-
strain Member States from also using the Council to slow down 
such processes again if deemed necessary.  At that time, what 
was actually happening in the Council occurred behind a cur-
tain of institutional secrecy with only limited access for the 
general public.  
3. Reasons for Change 
The Commission never stopped displaying its intention to 
speed up change. And the need for change was obvious: techno-
logical change had questioned the basis of natural monopolies. 
Globalization (at that time known under the heading of “opera-
tions of international companies”)57 required international net-
works and services, and so did national industries and world 
trade in general. Even the individual end user, the consumer, 
became increasingly dissatisfied with the level of services 
available. In addition, since 1984, deregulation in the United 
States had sent new powerful competitors into international 
markets. Indeed, 1984 became the year which saw the 
beginning by various attempts of the recently unbundled 
American Telephone and Telegraph Company (“AT&T”) to take 
a hold in the European market by founding, for example, AT&T 
and Philips Telecommunications Besloten Vennootschap to-
gether with Koninklijke Philips Electronics NV (first attempts 
of cooperation dating back to 1982), a venture which later be-
came AT&T Network System International. AT&T bought a 
  
 56. See id. 
 57. See id. 
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25% share of Olivetti.58 AT&T was also initiating negotiations 
with Alcatel and began various other activities in Europe.59 
Change was happening in the Commission as well.  In 1983, 
a task force for information technology and telecommunications 
was formed. In 1984, the Senior Officials Group on Telecom-
munications was set up to give advice to the Commission.60 
This group promptly proposed an action program.61 That same 
year, the CEPT agreed to cooperate with the EU in the Euro-
pean Committees for Standardization and Electrotechnical 
Standardization.  The first recommendations on standardiza-
tion in the telecommunication area were issued in that year as 
well,62 followed by another recommendation on liberalizing the 
terminal equipment market. The year 1985 was mainly dedi-
cated to getting research activities off the ground.63 In 1986, 
the Directorate-General XIII (Telecommunications, Informa-
tion Industries, and Innovation) was created (today called  “In-
formation Society”).  In 1987, the EU saw a wide range of direc-
tives and regulations which, however, did not yet fundamen-
tally affect the operations of the national PTOs.64  So while the 
1987 Green Paper became the first clearly visible sign of 
change for telecommunication regulation in the EU, it did not 
necessarily come as a total surprise. 
The main aim of the 1987 Green Paper was, in its own words, 
“[to open up] the telecommunications sector without destroying 
  
 58. See ANNE-MARIE DEALAUNAY  MACULAN, HISTOIRE COMPARÉE DE 
STRATÉGIES ET DÉVELOPPEMENT DES TÉLÉCOMMUNICATIONS 98 (1997).  
 59. Id. 
 60. See Communication from the Commission to the Council on Telecom-
munications: Progress Report on the Thinking and Work Done in the Field 
and Initial Proposals for an Action Programme, COM(84)277 final. 
 61. See id.  
 62. See Council Recommendation 84/549 of 12 November 1984 Concerning 
the Implementation of Harmonization in the Field of Telecommunications, 
1984 O.J. (L 298) 49. 
 63. See Council Decision 87/372 of 25 July 1985 on a Definition Phase for 
a Community Action in the Field of Telecommunications Technologies: R & D 
Programme in Advanced Communications Technologies for Europe (RACE), 
1985 O.J. (L 210) 24; Council Decision 88/28 of 14 December 1987 on a Com-
munity Programme in the Field of Telecommunications Technologies: Re-
search and Development (R&D) in Advanced Communications Technologies 
in Europe (RACE Programme), 1998 O.J. (L 16) 35. 
 64. For more details, see ECKART WIECHERT , EUROPÄISCHES TELEKOM-
MUNIKATIONSRECHT – EUTKR - RECHTSVORSCHRIFTEN UND DOKUMENTE DER 
EU; EINFÜHRUNGEN UND ERLÄUTERUNGEN 28 (1995). 
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the organizational structures which maintain the integrity and 
viability of the infrastructures, and which allow the operators 
to carry out their public service functions.”65 However, this was 
only part of the message. When addressing the solutions, the 
1987 Green Paper did concede that the telecommunication ad-
ministrations were essentially necessary in order to provide for 
public service functions. But, at the same time, the Commis-
sion pointed out that it would become increasingly difficult to 
draw a line between those services that could be reserved to 
the PTOs and those which should be opened.66 And it added 
that time was running short to get started for change. After 
consultation on the 1987 Green Paper, the Commission pub-
lished its plans for the next five years up to 1992,67 which were 
then accepted by the Council in 1988.68 
4. Regulatory Activities Before the 1999                                   
Communications Review 
Not all instruments available to start the regulatory game 
were equal. Liberalization measures as provided by EC Treaty 
Article 86 (ex Article 90) had the particular advantage already 
mentioned above:  they could be used by the Commission alone 
— at least in theory.69 On the other hand, harmonization pro-
cedures, based on EC Treaty Article 95 (ex Article 100a), were 
a matter essentially for the Council for final decision.70 Which 
route to take for telecommunications? Following Yogi Berra’s 
advice on what to do when one comes to a fork in the road, both 
institutions went ahead with their ways. The Commission is-
  
 65. The 1987 Green Paper, supra note 42, at 7.  See also STEPHAN 
POLSTER, DAS TELEKOMMUNIKATIONSRECHT DER EUROPÄISCHEN GEMEINSCHAFT 
8 (1999). 
 66. For further details, see LAROUCHE , supra note 18, at 9. 
 67. See Communication from the Commission: Towards a Competitive 
Community-wide; Telecommunications Market in 1992 Implementing the 
Green Paper on the Development of the Common Market for Telecommunica-
tions Services and Equipment, COM(88)48 final. 
 68. See Council Resolution 88/C 257/01 of 30 June 1988 on the Develop-
ment of the Common Market for Telecommunications Services and Equip-
ment up to 1992, 1988 O.J. (C 257) 1. 
 69. EC TREATY art. 86. 
 70. Id. art. 95. 
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sued the “Terminal Equipment” directive in May 1988.71 While 
there had been common basic agreement on the goals, some 
Member States did challenge this kind of procedure which 
threatened their control of timing. They challenged the direc-
tive in court. The same happened to the later Commission Di-
rective 90/388 on Competition in the Markets for Telecommu-
nications Services (“Services Directive”), although by then a 
compromise on procedure with the Council had already been 
found, but still not all Member States had been happy with the 
consequences.72 
This compromise (“Compromise of December 1989”)73 was 
primarily a compromise on substance, the details of which have 
now lost their importance with the progress of liberalization 
and harmonization. But it was also a compromise on procedure 
in so much as both institutions would carry on with their liber-
alization and harmonization procedures. The Commission 
would use self-restraint and would go ahead with a liberaliza-
tion d irective only if there were as many Member States behind 
such an instrument as required if the same issue would have to 
be adopted by the Council in a harmonization procedure, i.e., a 
qualified majority of Member States.74 It is significant for the 
transparency of policy-making in the EU, at least at the time, 
that such information had to be deduced from a frugal press 
bulletin of a Council meeting, since the record of such meetings 
had not been publicly accessible.75  
In its judgments on the challenged directives, the ECJ basi-
cally affirmed the Commission’s legal argument, but with a 
  
 71. Commission Directive 88/301 of 16 May 1988 on Competition in the 
Markets in Telecommunications Terminal Equipment, 1988 O.J. (L 131) 73.  
This directive was subsequently updated by Commission Directive 94/46 of 13 
October 1994 Amending Directive 88/301 and Directive 90/388 in Particular 
with Regard to Satellite Communications, 1994 O.J. (L 268) 15 [hereinafter 
Commission Directive 94/46]. 
 72. Commission Directive 90/388, supra note 16.   
 73. For further discussion and sources see LAROUCHE , supra note 18, at 43. 
 74. See id. at 47.  
 75. The transparency situation, although still heavily criticized, has now 
changed legally, as far as any visit to European Community websites can 
show.  See Parliament and Council Regulation 1049/2001 of 30 May 2001 
Regarding Public Access to European Parliament, Council and Commission 
Documents, 2001 O.J. (L 145) 43 [hereinafter Parliament and Council Regu-
lation 1049/2001]. 
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slight twist.76 The court stated that the Commission could not 
act against Member States directly, but it could set the 
specification in general terms of obligations arising under EC 
Treaty Article 86.77 It concluded furthermore that approaches 
according to the liberalization rules and approaches according 
to the harmonization rule of EC Treaty Article 95 (ex Article 
100a) were not mutually exclusive — an argument the 
contesting parties had used against each other.78 But even 
more important was the confirmation from the ECJ that those 
“special or exclusive rights” in Article 86, which had been taken 
for granted for so long, could be subjected to liberalization 
measures. 
In any case, as far as procedures were concerned, the ECJ in 
essence confirmed the Compromise of December 1989:79 the 
Commission and the Council could go ahead in parallel with 
liberalization and harmonization measures.80 These decisions 
and the Compromise of December 1989 set the stage for the 
regulatory activities to come, but it also bred inconsistencies 
which would become apparent much later. Indeed, the next five 
years saw a wide range of activities both in the area of liberali-
zation and harmonization, however, not always in a sufficiently 
harmonized manner.81 
As indicated above, the main instrument to start liberaliza-
tion had been the Commission’s Services Directive.82 This Di-
  
 76. See Case 202/88, French Republic v. Commission, 1991 E.C.R. I-1223 
(against Commission Directive 88/301) [hereinafter Case 202/88]; Joined 
Cases C-271, C-281 & C-289/90, Spain v. Commission, 1992 E.C.R. I-5833 
(against Commission Directive 90/388). 
 77. See Case 202/88, 1991 E.C.R. I-1223, ¶ 17. 
 78. See LAROUCHE , supra note 18, at 52. 
 79. See id. at 53. 
 80. See id. 
 81. JOACHIM SCHERER, DIE ÜBERPRÜFUNG DES EUROPÄISCHEN 
TELEKOMMUNIKATIONSRECHTS: REGULIERUNGSBEDARF UND OPTIONEN FÜR DAS 
KÜNFTIGE RECHT DER ELEKTRONISCHEN KOMMUNIKATIONSINFRASTRUKTUR 7 
(2000). 
 82. See Commission Directive 90/388, supra note 72.  This directive is 
referred to, somewhat emphatically, since it exempted voice telephony but 
defined voice telephony rather narrowly, as “the very basis for . . . the intro-
duction of the Internet in the European Union.”  HERBERT UNGERER, USE OF 
EC COMPETITION RULES IN THE LIBERALISATION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION’S  
TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR : ASSESSMENT OF PAST EXPERIENCE AND 
CONCLUSIONS FOR USE IN OTHER UTILITY SECTORS  4 (2001), at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/speeches/text/sp2001_009_en.pdf. 
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rective subsequently provided the basis for directives on: (1) 
satellite services, for which exclusive rights were to be phased 
out by the end of 1994;83 (2) cable networks, which had to be 
opened to telecommunications services (with the exception of 
voice telephony at that time) and allowed to interconnect with 
telecommunication networks;84 and (3) mobile telephony, for 
which separate networks could be installed and which could 
then interconnect with third party networks.85  Total liberaliza-
tion came with the “Full Competition” Commission Directive 
96/19,86 except for those countries which had been granted 
transition periods.87 These transition periods have now expired. 
The starting document for the harmonization activities was 
Council Directive 90/387 on “Open Network Provisions” 
(“ONP”), which set out the harmonized conditions for network 
access.88 On that basis, further sector and issue specific direc-
tives followed, such as: (1) Council Directive 92/44 on “Leased 
Lines;”89 (2) Parliament and Council Directive 97/13 (“Licens-
ing Directive”), which harmonized procedural questions; 90 (3) 
  
 83. See Commission Directive 94/46, supra note 71, arts. 1, 2 & 4. 
 84. See Commission Directive 95/51 of 18 October 1995 Amending Direc-
tive 90/388 with Regard to the Abolition of the Restrictions on the Use of 
Cable Television Networks for the Provision of Already Liberalized Telecom-
munications Services, art. 1, 1995 O.J. (L 256) 49, 54. 
 85. See Commission Directive 96/2 of 16 January 1996 Amending Direc-
tive 90/388 with Regard to Mobile and Personal Communications, art. 1, 1996 
O.J. (L 20) 59, 65. 
 86. See Commission Directive 96/19 of 13 March 1996 Amending Directive 
90/388 with Regard to the Implementation of Full Competition in Telecom-
munications Markets, 1996 O.J. (L 74) 13. 
 87. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
 88. Council Directive 90/387 of 28 June 1990 on the Establishment of the 
Internal Market for Telecommunications Services Through the Implementa-
tion of Open Network Provision, 1990 O.J. (L 192) 1. 
 89. Council Directive 92/44 of 5 June 1992 on the Application of Open 
Network Provision to Leased Lines, 1992 O.J. (L 165) 27.  This directive was 
later amended by Parliament and Council Directive 97/51 of 6 October 1997 
Amending Council Directives 90/387 and 92/44 for the Purpose of Adaptation 
to a Competitive Environment in Telecommunications, 1997 O.J. (L 295) 23 
[hereinafter Parliament and Council Directive 97/51]; and Commission Deci-
sion 98/80 of 7 January 1998 on Amendment of Annex II to Directive 92/44, 
1998 O.J. (L 14) 27. 
 90. Parliament and Council Directive 97/13 of 10 April 1997 on a Common 
Framework for General Authorizations and Individual Licenses in the Field 
of Telecommunications Services, 1997 O.J. (L 117) 15 [hereinafter Parliament 
and Council Directive 97/13].   
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Parliament and Council Directive 97/33 on “Interconnection,” 
which also contained the first rules on EU wide universal ser-
vices; 91 and (4) Parliament and Council Directive 98/10 on 
“Voice Telephony,” which again also contained further regula-
tions on universal service (collectively the “ONP Directives”). 92 
5. Evaluation 
In all, these packages did not necessarily provide a transpar-
ent and clearly structured regulatory environment. Liberaliza-
tion and harmonization directives could not avoid occasionally 
addressing the same subject, nor was the terminology always 
consistent. Consequently, the new design for the regulatory 
environment became an important part of the Commission’s 
suggestions in the 1999 Communications Review.93 
Throughout this “first phase”94 (and up to this day) the Com-
mission kept evaluating progress at regular intervals in its 
reports on the Implementation of the Telecommunications 
  
 91. Parliament and Council Directive 97/33 of 30 June 1997 on Intercon-
nection in Telecommunications with Regard to Ensuring Universal Service 
and Interoperability Through Application of the Principles of Open Network 
Provision (ONP), 1997 O.J. (L 199) 32 [hereinafter Parliament and Council 
Directive 97/33].  It was later amended by Parliament and Council Directive 
98/61 of 24 September 1998 Amending Directive 97/33 with Regard to Opera-
tor Number Portability and Carrier Pre-selection, 1998 O.J. (L 268) 37. 
 92. Parliament and Council Directive 98/10 of 26 February 1998 on the 
Application of Open Network Provision (ONP) to Voice Telephony and on 
Universal Service for Telecommunications in a Competitive Environment, 
1998 O.J. (L 101) 24 [hereinafter Parliament and Council Directive 98/10]. 
 93. See 1999 Communications Review, supra note 38. 
 94. LAROUCHE , supra note 18, at ch. 1.  Larouche identifies four phases or 
“regulatory models.”  Id. at 1.  The first model running, in Larouche’s opinion, 
until 1990, and followed by the “regulatory model of the 1987 Green Paper” 
until 1996.  Id. at 1-3.  The time between 1996 and 1997 is termed the “tran-
sitional model” initiated by the 1992 Review of the Situation in the Telecom-
munications Services Sector, SEC(92)1048 final; Communication from the 
Commission, Green Paper on the Liberalisation of  Telecommunications In-
frastructure and Cable Television Networks: Part One: Principle and Time-
table, COM(94)440 final; and Green Paper on the Liberalisation of Telecom-
munications Infrastructure and Cable Television Networks: Part II: A Com-
mon Approach to the Provision of Infrastructure for Telecommunications in 
the European Union, COM(94)682 final.  The fourth phase, the “fully liberal-
ized model” started in 1998.  LAROUCHE , supra note 18, at 22.  Since this Arti-
cle focuses on the year 1999 and after, the author has taken the liberty of 
providing a more compressed time model. 
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Regulatory Package.95  Obviously, in these reports, implemen-
tation in the Member States played the main role. Up to the 
fifth report — the situation shortly before the 1999 Communi-
cations Review — this situation was still far from optimal.  By 
that time the Commission had started about ninety infringe-
ment procedures against Member States because they were not 
in conformity with the directives, particularly in the areas of 
authorization and interconnection.96 Authorizations were very 
often found not to be in conformity with the conditions set by 
the Commission.  Moreover, procedures were found to be overly 
time consuming, lacking transparency or were simply too com-
plicated or too expensive (not reflecting, it seemed, the costs of 
administration as prescribed in the Licensing Directive). In-
cumbents proved to be reluctant in many cases to provide suffi-
cient standard interconnection offers. National regulatory au-
thorities (“NRAs”) were lacking stamina or sufficient legal 
competence. Accounting principles established in the various 
sector specific ONP Directives had not been sufficiently imple-
mented in many Member States. 
But the basic figures looked fairly bright. Prices for regional 
and long distance calls had gone down, whereas prices for local 
  
 95. Reports are being periodically published by the Commission regarding 
the Implementation of the Telecommunications Regulatory Package: (1) 
Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parlia-
ment, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions 
on the Implementation of the Telecommunications Regulatory Package, 
COM(97)236 final; (2) Communication from the Commission to the Council, 
the European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions on the Implementation of the Telecommunications 
Regulatory Package: First Update, COM(97)504 final; (3) Communication 
from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic 
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Third Report on the 
Implementation of the Telecommunications Regulatory Package, COM(98)80 
final; (4) Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European 
Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the 
Regions: Fourth Report on the Implementation of the Telecommunications 
Regulatory Package, COM(98)594 final; (5) Communication from the Com-
mission to the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Fifth Report on the Implemen-
tation of the Telecommunications Regulatory Package, COM(99)537 final; 
and (6) Sixth Report on the Implementation of the Telecommunications Regu-
latory Package, COM(00)814 final [hereinafter Sixth Report].  
 96. See SCHERER, supra note 81, at 13.  In July 2001, there were still about 
sixty-five cases pending.  Id. 
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calls seemed to have risen only moderately. By November 1999, 
in all Member States there were roughly 250 providers of long 
distance calls, more than 220 local call providers, about 180 
national and international network providers and almost 400 
local network service providers. But, of course, there still were 
problems, and the 1999 Communications Review was designed 
to address them, and more. 
And politically? The political aim of the Commission — and 
the Commission did have political aims — was basically 
reached by solving the “service of a general economic interest” 
problem, the only area that could have generated potential po-
litical resistance.  The Member States had either reluctantly or 
willingly given up on the idea of the usefulness of a nationally 
privileged PTO, even for the purpose of such a public (univer-
sal) service. This service would have to be organized differ-
ently, and it might as well still end up with the incumbents. 
But politically the Member States by now were convinced, as 
seen in the words of a European official at that time:  
[T]he full effect of EU competition law in this respect could 
only be achieved by carefully correlating the measures with 
the development of the general regulatory framework and the 
build-up of a national “regulatory infrastructure” [with the 
help of the ONP Directives]. The approach was based on the 
conviction that the objectives at EU level of liberalising sec-
tors must be internalised into the Member States political 
and regulatory structures to create the necessary base and 
the “political mass” required for major liberalisation exer-
cises. 
The very basis of action in the telecommunications sector 
was that the Commission recognised the objective of universal 
service in the sector, but that it strongly emphasised propor-
tionality of measures to secure this goal. It generated, by 
broad consultation exercises, the general conviction that this 
task could be secured by less restrictive means than retention  
of monopoly rights, e.g. by financial contributions or the crea-
tion of universal service funds. The telecommunications sector 
is now seen as the best demonstration in the Community that 
the goals of competition and public service can therefore be 
complementary and mutually reinforcing.97 
The future will tell what remains of this confidence. 
  
 97. UNGERER, supra note 82, at 7. 
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B. The 1999 Communications Review 
1. The Mandate 
The various ONP Directives had included reference to a nec-
essary review of telecommunication regulation in view of mar-
ket developments.98 The review was preceded by a number of 
studies from external experts. The results of the studies were 
incorporated in the 1999 Communications Review. The term 
“Review” in this context is, of course, perhaps slightly mislead-
ing since the main thrust of this exercise was to argue for and 
to initiate change.  Indeed, this communication not only an-
nounced but effected change, or is still in the process of doing 
so.  
2. The Main Elements of the 1999 Communications Review 
The starting point of the 1999 Communications Review is the 
changing market, or rather market and technology changes. 
The 1999 Communications Review states: 
Technological and market change in the communications sec-
tor is proceeding at an ever-increasing pace. . . . The Internet 
is to a large extent overturning traditional market structures, 
providing a common platform for the delivery of a wide range 
of services. . . . Wireless applications are increasingly impor-
tant in all segments of the market. . . . Finally, the develop-
ment of technologies within the media sector, in particular 
digital television (DTV) is providing transactional “on de-
mand” services and new services such as data, Internet and 
E-commerce, characterised both by services on digital terres-
trial (DTTV) networks in many Member States, and a wave of 
satellite and cable TV digital platforms.99  
The impact of these changes is not clearly foreseeable. Based 
on this dilemma, the Commission goes on with a rhetorical bal-
ancing act: these markets should be left to develop, but they 
should also be helped by stimulation, then these markets 
  
 98. See Parliament and Council Directive 97/51, supra note 89, art. 1 
(amended art. 8 of the Council Directive 90/387); id. art. 2 (amended art. 14 of 
the Council Directive 92/44); Parliament and Council Directive 98/10, supra 
note 92, art. 31; Parliament and Council Directive 97/33, supra note 91, art. 
23(2); Parliament and Council Directive 97/13, supra note 90, art. 23.  See 
also SCHERER, supra note 81, at 15. 
 99. 1999 Communications Review, supra note 38, at iii-iv. 
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should be sustained, but, of course, public and consumer inter-
ests should also be protected in these markets. It seems 
worthwhile to reread this balancing act in the Commission’s 
very own words: 
How all the above trends [market and technology changes] 
will shape the market over the next decade cannot be forecast 
precisely. Regulators and market players alike face uncer-
tainty as they look towards the future convergent environ-
ment. Regulators will need to have very clear objectives, in-
cluding those of public interest, and a set of general-purpose 
regulatory “tools” if they are to succeed in stimulating and 
sustaining a market that remains vigorously competitive and 
meets users’ needs, while at the same time protecting con-
sumers’ rights.100 
Judging from these observations, regulation is seen as essen-
tially a management issue, i.e., reaching an optimum created 
from conflicting goals by balancing conflicting interests. In the 
1999 Communications Review environment, this management 
task is no longer primarily to manage the transition to compe-
tition by mainly helping new entrants — it is now about man-
aging competition itself. 
The 1999 Communications Review does not necessarily imply 
a change of policy objectives, although one could argue that 
consumer interests seem to have a stronger political weight 
now than in previous policy papers. Rather — and this seems 
to coincide with a general change of the political climate in the 
EU and Member States — there is perceivably less enthusiasm 
for EU institutions and almost consequently, the 1999 Com-
munications Review seems to propagate a phase of regulatory 
minimalism. We shall return later to this phenomenon. 
Then again, this regulatory minimalism runs into its own 
conflicting objectives: regulatory stability, yes, but in face of 
the dynamics of the market; technological neutrality, yes, but 
all equal services should be treated equally.  Finally, there is 
another example of elegant “European regulatory speak”: “fu-
ture regulation should: . . . be enforced as closely as practicable 
to the activities being regulated, whether regulation has been 
agreed globally, regionally or nationally.”101 
  
 100. Id. at iv. 
 101. Id. at v. 
 4/24/02 6:44:28 PM 
770 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. XXVII:3 
How does the new philosophy of regulatory minimalism 
translate into the old environment of EU regulation? The 1999 
Communications Review suggests a two-tiered approach: (1) 
binding measures would be complemented by non-binding 
measures, or rather, the importance of non-binding measures 
would be made more visible; and (2) the range of the binding 
measures would be curtailed drastically. The 1999 Communi-
cations Review sees the new regulatory order like this: 
(1) Binding Measures: (a) a framework directive for the 
general and specific policy objectives; (b) four specific direc-
tives (on licensing, access and interconnection, universal ser-
vice, privacy and data protection); and (c) the continuing task 
of competition law with an intention to substitute sector spe-
cific regulation by general competition law;102 and 
(2) Non-Binding Measures: recommendations, guidelines, 
codes of conduct and other non-binding instruments to respond 
to market developments.103 
The very near future, however, would show how insufficient 
non-binding measures could turn out to be. The “local loop” 
problem was waiting to show its persistence. It was not that 
the Commission had not already seen the local loop problem 
looming in the background. The 1999 Communications Review 
in fact had stated: “Urgent action is required to increase com-
petition in the local loop.”104 But the Commission was a bit too 
hopeful with regard to the efficiency of non-binding measures 
and a bit too confident that competition tools would be suffi-
cient. Nevertheless, it is interesting to read how the necessity 
of binding regulations leads (at least in a first step) to a need 
for “recommendations”: 
National regulators in many Member States are introducing 
requirements for incumbents to unbundle their local access 
networks for use by competing service providers. The Com-
mission welcomes this trend and considers that Community 
action cannot wait for legislation to be adopted in this area. 
Instead, the Commission will use Recommendations and, in 
specific cases, its powers under the competition rules of the 
  
 102. Id. at v-vi, 16. 
 103. Id. at 18. 
 104. Id. 
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Treaty to encourage local loop unbundling throughout the 
EU.105 
Whereas the regulatory approach adopted the minimal per-
spective, the general concept and outlook of the Commission 
had by now broadened: the 1999 Communications Review 
shows the Commission’s intent to address the electronic com-
munication infrastructure of the EU as such, allowing excep-
tions only for content related rules. In short, the Commission 
was ready not only to make telecommunications regulation 
“lighter” but also to take on convergence. 
This perspective had been prepared by the above mentioned 
Green Paper on Convergence in 1997.106 It had been open for 
consultation processes which were summarized in a working 
document. The working document had invited a second round 
of consultations asking for input on “access to networks and 
digital gateways in a converging environment, creating the 
framework for investment, innovation, and encouraging Euro-
pean content production, distribution and availability, and en-
suring a balanced approach to regulation.”107 The results of 
that second round had become part of yet another communica-
tion,108 which was then integrated into the 1999 Communica-
tions Review.109 
  
 105. 1999 Communications Review, supra note 38, at ix. 
 106. See Green Paper on Convergence, supra note 40.  As Scherer points 
out, the change is also the result of subtle changes resulting from inner-
institutional competition between the now called “Education and Culture” 
General Directorate, formerly called “Information, Communication, Culture 
and Audio-Visual Media,” and the “Information Society” General Directorate, 
formerly called “Telecommunications, Information Market and Exploitation 
of Research, Information Industry and Market and Language Processing.”  
SCHERER, supra note 81, at 18 n.52 
 107. Working Document of the Commission: Summary of the Results of the 
Public Consultation on the Green Paper on the Convergence of the Telecom-
munications, Media and Information Technology Sectors; Areas For Further 
Reflection, SEC(98)1284, available at http://europa.eu.int/ISPO/conver-
gencegp/workdoc/1284en.pdf. 
 108. See Communication from the Commission to the Council, the Euro-
pean Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of 
the Regions: The Convergence of the Telecommunications, Media and Infor-
mation Technology Sectors, and the Implications for Regulation: Results of 
the Public Consultation on the Green Paper [COM(97)623], COM(99)108 
final. 
 109. See SCHERER, supra note 81, at 19. 
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Furthermore, the 1999 Communications Review took in the 
results from the consultations on the Green Paper on Radio 
Spectrum Policy110 and conclusions from the Report on the De-
velopment of the Market for Digital Television in Europe.111 In 
the 1999 Communications Review, the Commission thus 
marked the beginning of at least the intention to develop a 
comprehensive “electronic communications policy” rather than 
a merely reformed continuation of “telecommunications policy.”  
As regards the regulatory consequences of convergence, the 
1999 Communications Review again gives a slightly confusing 
impression. The Commission affirms that a single regulatory 
framework for communications infrastructure and associated 
services is advisable and will be the objective for further regu-
lation.112 Technical convergence, however, does not necessarily 
lead to regulatory convergence. There may be different public 
sector interests in different converging areas which require 
different treatment.113 The Commission cannot deny the exis-
tence of a highly differentiated system of regulations in the 
Member States which seek to meet the different public interest 
issues in the different areas of communications services and 
which have led to separation into:  
(1) telecommunications services or, in the new terminology 
of the working papers accompanying the 1999 Communications 
Review, “communication service” defined as:  
[S]ervices provided for remuneration which consist wholly or 
mainly in the transmission and routing of signals on elec-
tronic communications networks; it covers inter alia telecom-
munications services and transmission services in networks 
used for broadcasting. It does not cover services such as the 
  
 110. See Green Paper on Radio Spectrum Policy in the Context of European 
Community Policies such as Telecommunications, Broadcasting, Transport, 
and R&D, COM(98)596 final [hereinafter Green Paper on Radio Spectrum 
Policy]. 
 111. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, 
the Council, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the 
Regions: The Development of the Market for Digital Television in the Euro-
pean Union: Report in the Context of Directive 95/47 of the European Par-
liament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the Use of Standards for the 
Transmission of Television Signals, COM(99)540 final. 
 112. See 1999 Communications Review, supra note 38, at vi. 
 113. Id. at 5. 
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content of broadcasting transmissions, delivered using elec-
tronic communications networks and services.114 
(2) electronic mass communication services (e.g., radio and 
television); and  
(3) “Information Society” services, defined rather elabo-
rately, for example, in Council Directive 2000/31 (“Electronic 
Commerce Directive”) as:115 
[A]ny service normally provided for remuneration, at a dis-
tance, by means of electronic equipment for the processing 
(including digital compression) and storage of data, and at the 
individual request of a recipient of a service; those services . . 
. which do not imply data processing and storage are not cov-
ered by this definition. Information society services span a 
wide range of ec onomic activities which take place on-line; 
these activities can, in particular, consist of selling goods on-
line; activities such as the delivery of goods as such or the 
provision of services off-line are not covered; information soci-
ety services are not solely restricted to services giving rise to 
on-line contracting but also, in so far as they repr esent an 
economic activity, extend to services which are not remuner-
ated by those who receive them, such as those offering on-line 
information or commercial communications, or those provid-
ing tools allowing for search, access and retrieval of data; in-
formation society services also include services consisting of 
the transmission of information via a communication net-
work, in providing access to a communication network or in 
hosting information provided by a recipient of the service; 
television broadcasting within the meaning of Directive 
EEC/89/552 and radio broadcasting are not information soci-
ety services because they are not provided at individual re-
quest; by contrast, services which are transmitted point to 
  
 114. Communication from the Commission: The Results of the Public Con-
sultation on the 1999 Communications Review and Orientation for the New 
Regulatory Framework, COM(00)239 final [hereinafter Results of the Public 
Consultation]. 
 115. Earlier definitions can be found in Parliament and Council Directive 
98/34 of 22 June 1998 Laying Down a Procedure for the Provision of Informa-
tion in the Field of Technical Standards and Regulations, 1998 O.J. (L 204) 
37.  The directive was later amended by Parliament and Council Directive 
98/48 of 20 July 1998 Amending Directive 98/34 Laying Down a Procedure for 
the Provision of Information in the Field of Technical Standards and Regula-
tions, 1998 O.J. (L 217) 18; and Parliament and Council Directive 98/84 of 20 
November 1998 on the Legal Protection of Services Based on, or Consisting 
of, Conditional Access, 1998 O.J. (L 320) 54. 
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point, such as video-on-demand or the provision of commercial 
communications by electronic mail are information society 
services; the use of electronic mail or equivalent individual 
communications for instance by natural persons acting out-
side their trade, business or profession including their use for 
the conclusion of contracts between such persons is not an in-
formation society service; the contractual relationship be-
tween an employee and his employer is not an information so-
ciety service; activities which by their very nature cannot be 
carried out at a distance and by electronic means, such as the 
statutory auditing of company accounts or medical advice re-
quiring the physical examination of a patient are not informa-
tion society services.116 
Consequently, the Commission states in the 1999 Communi-
cations Review that: “These rules would of course be without 
prejudice to regulatory obligations (whether at EU or national 
level) which apply to the content of broadcasting services or 
other information society services.”117 Thus, the 1999 Commu-
nications Review leaves untouched the system of division be-
tween contents, conduit and transaction services, but at the 
same time the Commission seeks to introduce its own con-
cept.118 The Commission first sets aside services provided over 
  
 116. Parliament and Council Directive 2000/31 of 8 June 2000 on Certain 
Legal Aspects of Information Society Services, in Particular Electronic Com-
merce, in the Internal Market (Directive on Electronic Commerce), ¶¶ 17-18, 
2000 O.J. (L 178) 1, 3-4 [hereinafter Parliament and Council Directive 
2000/31]. 
 117. 1999 Communications Review, supra note 38, at vi. 
 118. The activities in the area of Internet content, based on the Council 
Recommendation 98/560 of 24 September 1998 on the Development of the 
Competitiveness of the European Audiovisual and Information Services In-
dustry by Promoting National Frameworks Aimed at Achieving a Compara-
ble and Effective Level of Protection of Minors and Human Dignity, 1998 O.J. 
(L 270) 48; and resulted in Parliament and Council Decision Adopting a 
Multi-annual Community Action Plan on Promoting Safer Use of the Internet 
by Combating Illegal and Harmful Content on Global Networks, 1999 O.J. (L 
33) 1, are not aimed at regulation but are encouraging self-regulatory activi-
ties and user empowerment.   
  Contents regulations or at least content related regulations in the 
Council Directive 89/552 of 3 October 1989 on the Coordination of Certain 
Provisions Laid Down by Law, Regulation or Administrative Action in Mem-
ber States Concerning the Pursuit of Television Broadcasting Activities, 1989 
O.J. (L 298) 23, relate to the services aspects of broadcasting.  The directive is 
later amended by Parliament and Council Directive 97/36 of 30 June 1997 
Amending Directive 89/552 on the Coordination of Certain Provisions Laid 
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networks, e.g., broadcasting services and electronic banking. 
This is an area to be regulated, as the case may be, by national 
law or by specific measures of EU law, like the Electronic 
Commerce Directive already quoted or Council Directive 
97/36.119  According to the 1999 Communications Review, the 
remaining traditional “conduit” part then has two sub-parts: (1) 
“Associated Services” are communications services like the tra-
ditional telecommunications services, following the definition 
given above, and conditional access services; and (2) “Commu-
nications infrastructure” are communications networks and 
associated facilities like cable television networks and applica-
tion program interfaces (“APIs”).120 
But even with this model, the 1999 Communications Review 
cannot avoid (and even implicitly points to) a dilemma that it 
cannot sufficiently resolve itself. There are issues which link at 
least content and conduit almost inseparably, and these issues 
occur whenever one has to weigh property interests of owners 
of scarce or at least limited transport resources (frequencies) 
against public interests. This weighing of interests produces 
“must carry” rules which the Commission has to address.121 
And these rules show the limitations of such a separating ap-
proach. So, although the 1999 Communications Review started 
out with a broad perspective on convergent infrastructures, it 
is stuck with the need to carry on with regulatory differentia-
tion.  
The minimalism philosophy, the broadened but somewhat 
double-bound view on convergence and the practical experi-
ences with the past regulatory arrangements lead the Commis-
sion to give specifics in its new regulatory program.  As regards 
the binding measures and the new framework directive, the 
Commission suggests that such a directive should: 
[1] [I]dentify specific policy objectives for Member States. . .  
[2] guarantee specific consumers’ rights (e.g. dispute resolu-
tion procedures, emergency call numbers, access to informa-
tion, etc.); 
  
Down by Law, Regulation or Administrative Action in Member States Con-
cerning the Pursuit of Television Broadcasting Activities, 1997 O.J. (L 202) 
60 [hereinafter Parliament and Council Directive 97/36].  
 119. Parliament and Council Directive 97/36, supra note 118. 
 120. 1999 Communications Review, supra note 38, at vii fig. 
 121. See id. at 30; SCHERER, supra note 81, at 21. 
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[3] ensure an appropriate level of interoperability for com-
munications services and equipment; 
[4] set out the rights, responsibilities, decision making pow-
ers and procedures of NRAs (e.g. criteria for implementation 
of flexibility clauses, forbearance), including possibilities for 
appeal at national level and obligations to exclude arrange-
ments that are contrary to Community competition law. 122 
The four specific directives would comprise the following: 
[1] Directive on authorisations and licensing, (based on the 
Licensing Directive including rules for effective management 
of, and access to, scarce resources); 
[2] Directive on the provision of universal service, 
incorporating elements of the current Voice Telephony 
Directive, and Interconnection Directive; 
[3] Directive on access and interconnection (based on the 
current Interconnection Directive and the TV standards Di-
rective); [and] 
[4] Directive on data protection and privacy in the tele-
communications sector (based on the Telecoms Data Protec-
tion Directive, updated and clarified to take account of tech-
nological developments). 123 
The 1999 Communications Review did provide some further 
information on how such regulation would look in more detail. 
We will revisit the themes below when analyzing the current 
situation. In the area of non-binding instruments, the Commis-
sion remained very “flexible”: 
Complementary measures include guidelines and recommen-
dations developed by the Commission or national authorities. 
Where appropriate, codes of conduct, co-regulation agree-
ments, recommendations, standards, memoranda of under-
standing, redress procedures, and other similar measures 
could be drawn up in parallel with the aim of achieving har-
monised solutions to common problems. Such measures can 
be more easily and quickly agreed or adapted than legislation 
and — where they are agreed by consensus of interested par-
ties and backed up by effective sanctions in cases of non-
compliance — can be very effective. . . . They provide a flexi-
ble tool for regulators, and will allow for regulation that is re-
  
 122. 1999 Communications Review, supra note 38, at 15. 
 123. Id.  
 4/24/02 6:44:28 PM 
2002] EU TELECOM DEREGULATION  777 
sponsive to the changing needs of the communications ser-
vices market.124 
There was another, this time outspoken, question in the air 
at least since the Green Paper on Convergence: would there be 
or should there be a European regulatory authority (“ERA”)?125 
However, based on external advice126 and institutional insight 
in view of the responses to public consultation, the Commission 
refrained from proposing such an authority.  This does not im-
ply that the then institutional structure of regulation was con-
sidered satisfactory: since the beginning of deregulation, Mem-
ber States had separated the regulatory activities of their ad-
ministration from their operational functions.127 There had 
been manifold information and notification duties of NRAs to 
the Commission, and there had already been dispute resolu-
tion.128 In addition, EU regulations had created several new 
bodies and committees, with different purposes and procedures 
on the Community level.129 
It was thus tempting to cut through these organizations and 
create an ERA. The Commission’s concession not to pursue this 
idea any longer came with a price for the NRAs. The Commis-
sion suggested in the 1999 Review: 
Since the rules at EU level will be more general than at 
present, there will be a need for mechanisms to ensure that 
NRAs apply the objectives and principles set out in the direc-
tives in a way which safeguards the integrity of the internal 
market. 
. . . . 
 
  
 124. Id. at 18. 
 125. See SCHERER, supra note 81, at 80.  For general information on the 
problem of such an authority within the context of EU law in contrast to U.S. 
law, see Xénophon A. Yataganas, Delegation of Regulatory Authority in the 
European Union: The Relevance of the American Model of Independent 
Agencies, Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 03/01, 
http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers.01/010301.rtf 2001. 
 126. See EUROSTRATEGIES/CULLEN INT’L, FINAL REPORT ON THE POSSIBLE 
ADDED VALUE OF EUROPEAN REGULATORY AUTHORITY FOR 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS  (1999), available at http://europa.eu.int/ISPO/infosoc/ 
telecompolicy/en/erastudy.pdf. 
 127. See SCHERER, supra note 81, at 79. 
 128. See Parliament and Council Directive 98/10, supra note 92, art. 26. 
 129. For more details, see SCHERER, supra note 81, at 80. 
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The Commission continues to have a number of concerns 
with regard to the effectiveness of some of these arrange-
ments, and will strengthen existing legal provisions to ensure 
that: 
- the independent national regulator can undertake its role 
of supervision of the market free from political interference, 
without prejudice to the government’s responsibility for na-
tional policy; 
- allocation of NRA responsibilities to different bodies does 
not lead to delays and duplication of decision making; 
- where sector-specific regulators and national competition 
authorities are both involved in issues related to communica-
tions infrastructure and associated services, there is effective 
co-operation between the two bodies and that NRAs ensure 
that their decisions are compatible with Community competi-
tion law; 
- the decision -making procedures at national level are 
transparent.  
. . . . 
 
The Commission recognises the need for a clear regulatory 
function to be exercised at the level of the Union . . . . The 
Commission pr oposes to: 
-replace the existing two telecommunications committees 
with a new Communications Committee, drawing on the ex-
pertise of a new High Level Communications Group involving 
the Commission and NRAs to help improve the consistent ap-
plication of Community legislation; 
-review existing legal provisions with a view to (i) strength-
ening the independence of NRAs, (ii) ensuring that the alloc a-
tion of responsibilities between institutions at national level 
does not lead to delays and duplications of decision making 
(iii) improving cooperation between sector specific and general 
competition authorities and (iv) requiring transparency of de-
cision making procedures at a national level.130 
How much coordination and information this would mean for 
NRAs would soon be shown in the new regulatory package, 
when the ideas as to institutional balances in the new regula-
tory framework would take shape. Again, this is an issue worth 
revisiting later for a more general analysis. 
  
 130. 1999 Communications Review, supra note 38, at 53. 
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C. Consequences of the 1999 Communications Review: The New 
Regulatory Package 
1. The New Regulatory Package and its Progress 
The 1999 Communications Review contained a number of 
specific proposals for: (1) licensing and authorizations; (2) ac-
cess and interconnection; (3) universal service; (4) competition 
in the local loop; and (5) consistent regulatory action at the EU 
level.131 The 1999 Communications Review proposals initiated 
the usual consultation process, which lasted until February 
  
 131. Id. at 55.  The 1999 Communications Review also contained observa-
tions on the radio spectrum policies.  The main purposes of regulatory activi-
ties in this area have been transparency and coordination, allowing discus-
sion of radio spectrum issues at Community level where Community interests 
and policies are concerned, and ensuring a (partial) mandate to defend Com-
munity interests in international negotiations.  Id. at 55-57.   
  This approach has so far been dealt with in the following documents: 
Green Paper on Radio Spectrum Policy, supra note 110; Parliament Resolu-
tion A4-0202/99 on the Commission Green Paper on Radio Spectrum Policy in 
the Context of European Community Policies such as Telecommunications, 
Broadcasting, Transport, and R&D (COM(98)0596 – C4-0066/99), 1999 O.J. 
(C 279) 72;  Communication from the Commission to the Council, the Euro-
pean Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of 
the Regions: Next Steps in Radio Spectrum Policy: Results of the Public Con-
sultation on the Green Paper, COM(99)538 final; and Parliament Resolution 
A5-0122/2000 on the Commission Communication to the Council, the Euro-
pean Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of 
the Regions on “Next Steps in Radio Spectrum Policy - Results of the Public 
Consultation on the Green Paper” (COM(99)538 – C5-0113/2000 – 
2000/2073(COS)), 2001 O.J. (C 59) 245.   
  Further documents include: Communication from the Commission to 
the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee 
and the Committee of the Regions: Results of the World Radiocommunica-
tions Conference 2000 (WRC-2000) in the Context of Radio Spectrum Policy 
in the European Community, COM(00)811 final; Proposal for a Decision of 
the European Parliament and of the Council on a Regulatory Framework for 
Radio Spectrum Policy in the European Community, 2000 O.J. (C 365 E) 256 
[hereinafter Radio Spectrum Policy Proposal].  This proposal was discussed in 
the Council (of Telecommunications Ministers) on June 27, 2001 and has 
received its First Reading in the European Parliament on July 5, 2001.  See 
also Report on the Proposal for a Decision of the European Parliament and of 
the Council on a Regulatory Framework for Radio Spectrum Policy in the 
European Community, A5-0232/2001 final, at 
http://www2.europarl.eu.int/omk/OM-Europarl?PROG=REPORT&L= 
EN&PUBREF=//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A5-2001-0232+0+DOC+PDF+ 
V0//EN&LEVEL=3&NAV=S (last visited May 1, 2002). 
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2000.  In April 2000, the result of this consultation process was 
made public in a communication to the Parliament and the 
Council.132  
In July 2000, the Commission adopted several proposals 
which formed the new regulatory package: (1) a proposal for a 
directive on the new regulatory framework;133 (2) a proposal for 
a directive on access and interconnection;134 (3) a proposal for a 
directive on authorizations;135 (4) a proposal for a directive on 
universal service and users’ rights;136 (5) a proposal for a direc-
tive on data protection;137 (6) measures as regards the local loop 
problem; and (7) a Proposal for a Decision of the European Par-
liament and the Council on a Regulatory Framework for Radio 
Spectrum Policy in the European Community.138  
The five directive proposals were of the “harmonization” type 
based on EC Treaty Article 95, to be adopted in a co-decision 
procedure by the Council and the Parliament.139 In March 
2001, these proposals were supplemented by a notice from the 
Commission on the proposal of a “liberalization” directive based 
on EC Treaty Article 86 for which the Commission is solely re-
sponsible (within the limits of the Compromise of December 
  
 132. See Results of the Public Consultation, supra note 114. 
 133. See Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on a Common Regulatory Framework for Electronic Communications 
Networks and Services, 2000 O.J. (C 365 E) 198 [hereinafter Framework 
Proposal].  
 134. See Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on Access to, and Interconnection of, Electronic Communications 
Networks and Associated Facilities, 2000 O.J. (C 365 E) 215. 
 135. See Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the Authorisation of Electronic Communications Networks and 
Services, 2000 O.J. (C 365 E) 230.  
 136. See Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on Universal Service and Users’ Rights Relating to Electronic Com-
munications Networks and Services, 2000 O.J. (C 365 E) 238 [hereinafter 
Universal Service Proposal]. 
 137. See Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council Concerning the Processing of Personal Data and the Protection of 
Privacy in the Electronic Communications Sector, 2000 O.J. (C 365 E) 223 
[hereinafter Data Protection Proposal]; Parliament and Council Directive 
97/66 Concerning the Processing of Personal Data and the Protection of Pri-
vacy in the Telecommunications Sector, 1998 O.J. (L 24) 1 [hereinafter Par-
liament and Council Directive 97/66]. 
 138. See Radio Spectrum Policy Proposal, supra note 131. 
 139. EC TREATY art. 95. 
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1989) and which will consolidate the Services Directive of 1990 
as modified in 1996 and 1999.140  
As regards measures for competition in the local loop, the 
Commission was immediately going ahead, taking the usual 
steps but taking them unusually fast, first by directly issuing 
— in parallel to the communication on the general results of 
the post-1999 Communications Review consultation process — 
a communication and a proposal for a recommendation,141 then 
a month later the recommendation.142 In the end, the recom-
mendation proved to be insufficient: a regulation was needed, 
and a proposal for a regulation concerning the local loop be-
came part of the regulatory package of July 2000.143 Although 
the proposal for the local loop regulation received several 
amendments in the Council and the Parliament,144 it became 
the first and so far only proposal of that package that was 
turned into a legally binding instrument, entering into force in 
the beginning of 2001.145 
So, from the various options available to address the local 
loop issue,146 the Commission had given up the recommenda-
tion approach and had made true its 1999 Communications 
Review warning by now directly prescribing a standard offer 
for unbundled access, strictly cost-based and to be supervised 
by the NRAs. This fast-track approach was also another, and 
  
 140. See Notice by the Commission Concerning a Draft Directive on Com-
petition in the Markets for Electronic Communications Services, 2001 O.J. (C 
96) 2.  
 141. See Communication from the Commission: Unbundled Access to the 
Local Loop: Enabling the Competitive Provision of a Full Range of Electronic 
Communication Services Including Broadband Multimedia and High-Speed 
Internet, COM(00)237 final. 
 142. See Commission Recommendation of 25 May 2000 on Unbundled Ac-
cess to the Local Loop: Enabling the Competitive Provision of a Full Range of 
Electronic Communications Services Including Broadband Multimedia and 
High-Speed Internet, 2000 O.J. (L 156) 44.  
 143. See Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on Unbundled Access to the Local Loop, 2000 O.J. (C 365 E) 212.  
 144. See Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the 
Council on Unbundled Access to the Local Loop, COM(00)394 final; Amended 
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
Unbundled Access to the Local Loop, 2001 O.J. (C 62 E) 314. 
 145. See Parliament and Council Regulation 2887/2000, supra note 1. 
 146. For more detail, see LAROUCHE , supra note 18, at 324. 
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this time more direct answer to the question whether telecom 
law was still needed in addition to competition law.   
The whole of the regulatory program of the 1999 Communi-
cations Review had in fact been an answer to that question 
whether it would not be sufficient  — after having reached the 
stage of “full competition” — to rely on (general) competition 
law alone, rather than to carry on (also) with sector specific 
(and framework) regulations for communications services. In 
the context of the Green Paper on Convergence, there had al-
ready been a strongly supported opinion that EU competition 
law would, at least in the near future, be fully sufficient to 
handle the problems of telecommunications.147 But there were 
a number of deficiencies in competition law.148 Among them the 
local loop situation.  Whereas, looking at the European situa-
tion in general, at the level of the trunk networks, there was a 
fair amount of services and infrastructure competition in 
Europe.  The incumbent telecommunications operators had still 
kept an almost natural monopoly in the area of the “last mile” 
or “local loop” or “subscriber network,” a situation which al-
lowed for hardly anything else than service based competition 
in this field. Or, as Herbert Ungerer had keenly observed in 
1999: 
[W]hile we have changed successfully the regulatory fram e-
work across Europe and . . . as well as in implementation con-
trol, we have not changed market structures. In all EU Mem-
ber States . . . the incumbents continue to have a firm bottle-
neck control on competition in the local loop. Europe has de-
regulated, but it has done this without a divestiture.149 
New technologies, like wireless services, did not necessarily 
change this situation, since the question of which of the local 
lines would eventually be accepted by the subscriber adds addi-
tional investment risks. In the Commission’s view, what it 
called “regulatory minimalism” did not imply leaving interven-
tion to competition law alone.  The urgency of this situation 
explains why the Commission had moved ahead so vigorously 
  
 147. See id. at 322 n.1. 
 148. See id. at 322. 
 149. Herbert Ungerer, Local Loop Unbundling, Keynote Address at London 
Business School. (June 14, 1999), at http://www.europa.eu.int/ 
comm/competition/speeches/text/sp1999_011_en.html.   
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in the area of the local loop without waiting for the fate of the 
other parts of the new regulatory package. 
The remaining five “harmonization” directive proposals 
(framework, access and interconnection, authorization, univer-
sal services and users’ rights and data protection)150 which will 
now be the center of our further interest,151 are also progress-
ing at different speeds.  The Commission had initially planned 
to pass the whole package by the end of 2001. As shown, it has 
only succeeded with regard to the local loop issue. By Septem-
ber 2001, four proposals had their First Reading in Parliament, 
and the Council had reached political agreement on a “Common 
Position”152 on those four153 — the proposal on data protection 
  
 150. See supra notes 133-37 and accompanying text.  
 151. For a very detailed, yet highly readable analysis of the status of the 
package as of April 2001, see Robert Queck, Vers un Nouveau Cadre Régle-
mentaire Européen des Réseaux et Services de Communications Électroniques: 
Réflexions á Mi-Chemin, 9 REVUE UBIQUITÉ  41 (2001).  
 152. Political agreement means agreement on a “common position” in prin-
cipal while the exact wording is still being framed in appropriate committees.  
See ROWE & MAW’S EU COMPETITION AND TRADE GROUP , EUROPEAN 
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE COMMUNICATIONS SECTOR  1 (June 2001), available at 
http://www.mayerbrownrowe.com/london/pdf/ec_comms_jun01.pdf [hereinaf-
ter ROWE & MAW’S EU COMPETITION AND TRADE GROUP].  Such agreement was 
reached for the framework proposal, the access and interconnection proposal 
and the authorization proposal in the meeting of the Telecommunications 
Council (the responsible ministers for telecommunications from the Member 
States) in its meeting in April 2001.  See Press Release, 2340th Council Meet-
ing, Transport/Telecommunications (Apr. 4-5, 2001), available at 
http://ue.eu.int/newsroom/LoadDoc.asp?MAX=1&BID=87&DID=66088&LAN
G=1 [hereinafter 2340th Council Meeting].  Political agreement on the uni-
versal service proposal was reached in the meeting of the Telecommunica-
tions Council in June 2001.  See ROWE &  MAW’S  EU  COMPETITION AND TRADE 
GROUP , supra note 152, at 1.  
 153. The first proposal is the Amended Proposal for a Directive of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on a Common Regulatory Frame-
work for Electronic Communications Networks and Services, COM(01)380 
final [hereinafter Amended Framework Proposal].  For the current state of 
the drafting of the Common Position in the Council, see Council of the Euro-
pean Union Brussels, Outcome of Proceedings, Draft Directive of the Euro-
pean Parliament and of the Council on a Common Regulatory Framework for 
Electronic Communications Networks and Services – Common Positions, May 
11, 2001, Interinstitutional File 2000/0184 (COD) 8208/01 ECO 116 CODEC 
357.   
  The second proposal is the Amended Proposal for a Directive of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on Access to, and Interconnection of, 
Electronic Communications Networks and Associated Facilities, COM(01)369 
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is still waiting for the First Reading,154 and any fast agreement 
on this issue is highly unlikely.155 It is assumed now that the 
package will be passed in Spring 2002, with an obligation for 
the Member States to transform the directives into national 
law by 2003.  For reasons given in the introduction, an over-
view of the most important substantive elements of the propos-
als will be based on the original proposals as presented by the 
Commission in 2000.  
  
final [hereinafter Amended Interconnection Proposal].  For the current state 
of the drafting of the Common Position in the Council, see Council of the 
European Union Brussels, Outcome of Proceedings, Draft Directive of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on Access to, and Interconnection of, 
Electronic Communications Networks and Associated Facilities – Common 
Position, May 11, 2001, Interinstitutional File 2000/0186 (COD) 8200/01ECO 
114 CODEC 355.    
  The third proposal is the Amended Proposal for a Directive of the 
European Parliament and the Council on the Authorisation of Electronic 
Communications Networks and Services, COM(01)372 final [hereinafter 
Amended Authorization Proposal].  For the current state of the drafting of 
the Common Position in the Council, see Council of the European Union 
Brussels, Draft Directive of the European Parliament and the Council on the 
Authorisation of Electronic Communications Networks and Services – Com-
mon Position, May 11, 2001, Interinstitutional File 2000/0188 (COD) 8203/01 
ECO 115CODEC 356.   
  The fourth proposal is the Proposal for a Directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on Universal Service and Users’ Rights Relat-
ing to Electronic Communications Networks and Services, COM(00)392.  For 
the current state of the drafting of the Common Position in the Council, see 
Council of the European Union Brussels, Draft Directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on Universal Service and Users’ Rights Relat-
ing to Electronic Communications Networks and Services, July 6, 2001, In-
terinstitutional File 10661/01 ECO 211 CODEC 717. 
 154. For the current state of the drafting of the Common Position in the 
Council, see Council of the European Union Brussels, 29 June 2001, Outcome 
of Proceedings, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of 
the Council Concerning the Processing of Personal Data and the Protection of 
Privacy in the Electronic Communications Sector, Interinstitutional File 
2000/0189 (COD) 10451/01ECO 202 CODEC 677.  There is still disagreement 
on the question of unsolicited communications and French and British dele-
gations still maintain parliamentary scrutiny reservations.  Id. 
 155. See Council of the European Union, Outcome of Proceedings of Work-
ing Party on Telecommunications, July 23, 2001, Interinstitutional File 
2000/0189 (COD) 11164/01 ECO 221 CODEC 778. 
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2. Some Observations on the Substance of the Regulatory 
Package 
The Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and 
of the Council on a Common Regulatory Framework for Elec-
tronic Communications Networks and Services (“Framework 
Proposal” or “FP”) maintains the convergence approach and the 
content/conduit-division, however, “it is open to address con-
tents issues in the interest of media pluralism, cultural diver-
sity and consumer protection.”156 The Framework Proposal con-
sequently defines its objects of regulation as: (1) electronic 
communications networks; (2) electronic communications ser-
vices; and (3) associated facilities: 
“[E]lectronic communications network” means transmission 
systems and, where applicable, switching or routing equip-
ment and other resources which permit the conveyance of 
signals by wire, by radio, by optical or by other electromag-
netic means, including satellite networks, fixed (circuit- and 
packet-switched, including Internet) and mobile terrestrial 
networks, networks used for radio and television broadcast-
ing, “powerline” systems and cable TV networks, irrespective 
of the type of information conveyed. 157 
 
“[E]lectronic communications service” means services pr o-
vided for remuneration which consist wholly or mainly in the 
transmission and routing of signals on electronic communica-
tions networks, including telecommunications services and 
transmission services in networks used for broadcasting, but 
excluding services providing, or exercising editorial control 
over, content transmitted using electronic communications 
networks and services,158[and] 
. . . . 
 
“[A]ssociated facilities” means those facilities associated with 
an electronic communications network and/or an electronic 
communications service, to which enable and/or support the 
provision of services via that network and/or service. It in-
cludes conditional access systems and electronic programme 
guides.159 
  
 156. See Framework Proposal, supra note 133.  
 157. Amended Framework Proposal, supra note 153, art. 2(a).  
 158. Id. art. 2(b). 
 159. Id. art. 2(d). 
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With these definitions, the FP has, of course, followed the 
convergence approach by integrating the transport side of radio 
and television and Internet services. At a closer look, however, 
and as a result of what might be called the convergence trap, 
this integration is more a textual than a functional integration. 
One of the main reasons for separate regulatory cultures in 
telecommunications and electronic mass media has been the 
content sensitivity of the latter. If one leaves untouched con-
tents in a converging approach, as was the declared intention 
of the Green Paper on Convergence and the 1999 Communica-
tions Review, convergence remains a formality. But even on the 
formal level, the new regulatory package prefers to place tele-
communications, radio and television regulations side by side 
under a common heading rather than seeking functional inte-
gration in one new conduit concept. And as indicated above, 
contents comes back even on that level as the must carry rules. 
To call this result “a merger of hitherto separate regulatory 
cultures”160 sounds slightly euphemistic.  
What the Framework Proposal does achieve, however, is 
changing the benchmark of intervention for the NRAs.  The 
basic market oriented question of a sector specific approach is 
when to allow authorities to set ex ante obligations for market 
participants. In the pre-1999 Communications Review regula-
tory framework, the threshold of intervention, or “significant 
market power” (“SMP”), was defined as follows: 
An organization shall be presumed to have significant market 
power when it has a share of more than 25% of a particular 
telecommunications market in the geograph ical area in a 
Member State within which it is authorized to operate.  Na-
tional regulatory authorities may nevertheless determine that 
an organization with a market share of less than 25% in the 
relevant market has significant market power. They may also 
determine that an organization with a market share of more 
than 25% in the relevant market does not have significant 
market power. In either case, the determination shall take 
into account the organization’s ability to influence market 
  
 160. Director General Robert Verrue, The New Regulatory Framework for 
Electronic Communications, Remarks at the Roundtable on Multi-Media and 
Telecommunications on the Future of Spectrum Management Organized by 
the European Institute (May 10, 2001), available at http://www.eurunion.org/ 
news/speeches/2001/ 010510rv.htm. 
 4/24/02 6:44:28 PM 
2002] EU TELECOM DEREGULATION  787 
conditions, its turnover relative to the size of the market, its 
control of the means of access to end-users, its access to finan-
cial resources and its experience in pr oviding products and 
services in the market.161 
This definition was seen as too formal to take fully into ac-
count the fact that since the gradual liberalization of the late 
1990’s, the situation of the incumbent national telecommunica-
tions operators which had originally been the addressees of 
that regulation was changing. Also, the SMP concept could not 
sufficiently address situations where a small number of com-
panies were exercising oligopoly power. And finally, this defini-
tion still left a large amount of discretion for intervention by 
the NRAs. The Commission had therefore intended to set a 
more clearly defined threshold for ex ante regulatory interven-
tion.162 In the FP, the definition of SMP moves away from a 
numerical benchmark notion. It now seeks to harmonize the 
definition with the general competition law definition (the con-
cept of “dominance”), and with the interpretation of this defini-
tion by the ECJ, justifying this move explicitly by referring, 
e.g., to oligopoly situations.  
Article 13 of the FP now gives the following definition of 
SMP: 
Undertakings with significant market power 
1. Where the Specific Measures require national regulatory 
authorities to determine whether operators have significant 
market power, paragraphs 2 and 3 shall apply. 
2. An undertaking shall be deemed to have significant 
market power if, either individually or jointly with others, it 
enjoys a position of economic strength affording it the power 
to behave to an appreciable extent independently of competi-
tors, customers and ultimately consumers. 
3. Where an undertaking has significant market power on a 
specific market, it may also be deemed to have significant 
market power on a closely related market, where the links be-
tween the two markets are such as to allow the market power 
held in one market to be leveraged into the other market, 
  
 161. Parliament and Council Directive 97/33, supra note 91, art. 4(3).  The 
same definition can be found in the directives on leased lines, voice telephony 
and authorization.  See Parliament and Council Directive 97/51, supra note 
89, art. 2(3); Parliament and Council Directive 98/10, supra note 92, art. 
2(2)(i); Parliament and Council Directive 97/13, supra note 90, art. 2(2). 
 162. See SCHERER, supra note 81, at 38. 
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thereby strengthening the market power of the undertak-
ing.163 
  
 163. Amended Framework Proposal, supra note 153, art. 13. The Frame-
work Proposal therefore introduces rather a complex procedure for determin-
ing such markets in Article 14: 
 
Market analysis procedure 
1. After a public consultation and consultation with national regu-
latory authorities through the Advisory Communications Group, the 
Commission shall issue a Decision on Relevant Product and Service 
Markets (hereinafter “the Decision”), addressed to Member States. 
The Decision shall identify those product and service markets within 
the electronic communications sector, the characteristics of which 
may be such as to justify the imposition of regulatory obligations set 
out in the Specific Measures, without prejudice to markets that may 
be defined in specific cases under competition law. The Commission 
shall also publish Guidelines on market analysis and the assessment 
of significant market power (hereinafter “the Guidelines”), which 
shall be in accordance with the case law of the Court of Justice and 
the Court of First Instance of the European Communities.  
The Commission may indicate in the Decision those markets 
which are trans-national. In such markets, the national regulatory 
authorities concerned shall jointly conduct the market analysis and 
decide on any imposition of regulatory obligations under paragraphs 
2 to 5 in a concerted fashion.  
National regulatory authorities shall seek and receive the prior 
agreement of the Commission before using market definitions that 
are different from those identified in the Decision or before imposing 
sector-specific regulatory obligations on markets other than those 
identified in the Decision. The Commission shall regularly review 
the Decision and the Guidelines. 
2. Within two months of the date of adoption of the Decision or 
any updating thereof, national regulatory authorities shall carry out 
an analysis of the product and service markets identified in the De-
cision, in accordance with the Guidelines. Member States shall en-
sure that national competition authorities are fully associated with 
that analysis. The national regulatory authorities’ analysis of each 
market shall be published.  
3. Where a national regulatory authority is required under Arti-
cles 16, 25 or 27 of Directive 2000/. . . /EC [on universal service and 
users rights relating to electronic communications networks and ser-
vices], or Articles 7 or 8 of Directive 2000/. . . /EC [on access to and 
interconnection of electronic communications networks and associ-
ated facilities] to determine whether to impose, maintain or with-
draw obligations on undertakings, it shall determine on the basis of 
its market analysis referred to in paragraph 2 whether a market 
identified in the Decision is effectively competitive in a specific geo-
graphic area in accordance with the Guidelines. 
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In practice this means that, as explained in the recital of the 
FP ex ante obligations, NRAs: 
[A]re justified only for undertakings which have financed in-
frastructure on the basis of special or exclusive rights in areas 
where there are legal, technical or economic barriers to mar-
ket entry, in particular for the construction of network infr a-
structure, or which are vertically integrated entities owning 
or operating network infrastructure for delivery of services to 
customers and also providing services over that infrastruc-
ture, to which their competitors necessarily require access.164 
 
This more general definition, although clarified by ECJ case 
law, makes a concise (and harmonized) definition of the rele-
vant market even more important, because that market defini-
tion now defines the ex ante possibilities for the interventions 
of NRAs. 
On the one hand, the (independent) NRAs remain free in 
their decision on which undertaking to select as a SMP to be-
come the subject of ex ante measures (as foreseen in the spe-
cific directives of the package). However, on the other hand, the 
criteria for their decision making, the Commission Working 
Document on Proposed New Regulatory Framework for Elec-
tronic Communications Networks and Services (“Draft Guide-
lines”), and in particular the definition of the markets which 
are the basis of market power analysis, remain subject to the 
  
4. Where a national regulatory authority concludes that the mar-
ket is effectively competitive, it shall not impose sector specific regu-
latory obligations set out in the Specific Measures. In cases where 
such sector specific regulatory obligations already exist, it shall 
withdraw such obligations placed on undertakings in that specific 
market. An appropriate period of notice shall be given to parties af-
fected by such a withdrawal of obligations. 
5. Where a national regulatory authority determines that a mar-
ket identified in the Decision is not effectively competitive in a spe-
cific geographic area in accordance with the Guidelines, it shall im-
pose the sector-specific regulatory obligations set out in the Specific 
Measures, or maintain such obligations where they already exist. 
6. Measures taken pursuant to paragraphs 4 and 5 shall be sub-
ject to the procedure set out in Article 6. 
Id. art. 14. 
 164. Id. ¶ 20.  
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discretion of the Commission.165  Since such “definition deci-
sions” of the Commission are not regulatory in the proper 
sense, and do not affect the decisions of the NRAs directly, the 
process of making such definition decisions is not embedded in 
the usual procedures of Commission decision making power.166 
Such specific procedures are only foreseen where the Commis-
sion makes decisions in the area of standardization167 and 
harmonization,168 and in some of the specific directives of the 
proposal package. 
The definition of SMP and the resulting actions by the NRAs 
are thus embedded in complex definition procedures.  In addi-
tion, the NRAs have to observe information, consultation and 
  
 165. See Commission Working Document on Proposed New Regulatory 
Framework, supra note 4.   
 166. The general rules for Commission decision making power are now set 
out in Council Decision 1999/468 of 28 June 1999 Laying Down the Proce-
dures for the Exercise of Implementing Powers Conferred on the Commission, 
1999 O.J. (L 184) 23.  This decision on procedures differentiates between four 
types of procedures of interaction between the Commission and the Member 
States for those areas where the Commission has decision making powers: (1) 
advisory procedure (art. 3); (2) management procedure (art. 4); (3) regulatory 
procedure (art. 5); and (4) safeguard procedure (art. 6).  Id.  The most impor-
tant is the regulatory procedure.  If there is disagreement between the Com-
mission and the committee of representatives of the Member States during 
that procedure, a complex resolution procedure takes place involving the 
Parliament and the Council with a slight structural advantage of the Com-
mission because of the way the procedures are laid out and because of time 
limits imposed.  This structure is generally referred to as “comitology.”  For 
further discussion, see FISCHER, supra note 14, at 79.  This complex pattern 
of interaction is not unusual but reflects the framework of the Commission’s 
rule making power.  In the context of the (general) data protection directive, 
see, e.g., Parliament and Council Directive 95/46 of 24 October 1995 on the 
Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and 
on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 3 [hereinafter Parlia-
ment and Council Directive 95/46].  The Commission centralizes the power to 
make the decisions on the “adequate level of protection” provided by third 
countries.  Id. art. 25(6).  In this decision, the Commission is advised by the 
committee of independent data protection authorities which in this case is 
called the “Working Party on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the 
Processing of Personal Data.”  Id. art. 29.  The measures the Commission 
intends to undertake are submitted to the representatives of the Member 
States, which together with the Commission representative form the “Com-
mittee.” Id. art. 31. 
 167. See Amended Framework Proposal, supra note 153, arts. 15(4), 19(2)-
(3).  
 168. Id. art. 16(1)-(2).  
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publication procedures. Having brought the SMP definition 
nearer to the competition law definition of “dominance” does 
not exclude differences. As the Draft Guidelines point out: 
18. To ensure consistency of approaches, these Guidelines 
are based on . . . existing jurisprudence of the Court of First 
Instance and the Court of Justice concerning market defini-
tion and the notion of dominant position within the meaning 
of Article 82 of the EC Treaty . . . .  
19. Markets defined by the Commission and NCAs [na-
tional competition authorities] in competition cases may, nev-
ertheless, vary from those identified in the Commission Deci-
sion and from market definitions identified by NRAs. . . .  The 
market definitions used by NRAs are without prejudice to 
those used by NCAs and by the Commission in the exer-
cise of their respective powers. 
20. In practice, parallel procedures under ex ante regula-
tion and competition law may arise with respect to different 
kinds of problems in relevant markets. NCAs may therefore 
investigate a market and market behaviour and impose ap-
propriate competition law remedies alongside any sector spe-
cific measures applied by NRAs.  However; it must be noted 
that such simultaneous application of remedies by different 
regulators would address different problems in such markets. 
21. NRAs will exercise their powers under Article 14 of [the 
Framework Proposal] to determine whether to designate un-
dertakings in the market as having SMP. In so doing, NRAs 
enjoy considerable discretion in the exercise of their powers, 
with respect to the complexity of inter -related factors that 
must be assessed concerning the economic, factual and legal 
elements of identified markets, subject to the consultation 
and transparency procedure foreseen.169 
Even this remaining  “decisional freedom” of the NRAs needs 
additional control to prevent the decisions from undermining 
the criteria. The “transparency mechanism”170 in the FP there-
fore requires NRAs to provide the Commission with draft 
measures (ex ante measures following from the SMP assess-
ment171 and measures in the context of the proposed directive 
  
 169. See Commission Working Document on Proposed New Regulatory 
Framework, supra note 4, at 6. 
 170. Amended Framework Proposal, supra note 153, art. 6. 
 171. See id. art. 14(4)-(5). 
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on “access and interconnection”172) after a period of consulta-
tion on the national and EU level. As a backup measure, the 
Commission reserves the right to intervene if the objectives of 
an open and competitive market and/or the regulatory princi-
ples173 are not met.174 
This approach in the new regulatory package has, of course, 
already created some resistance. The Commission, it was felt, 
losing out on the ERA model, sought to establish a functional 
equivalent. Robert Verrue, Director General of the Commission 
Directorate responsible for telecommunications, answered this 
criticism in a recent a speech in the U.S.:  
[L]et me outline our thinking. The electronic communications 
market is developing at an unprecedented speed. National 
regulators are closest to their market, so it should be for them 
to tailor regulation to fit the circumstances of that market. 
The new Directives leave a very large degree of flexibility to 
national regulators. NRAs assess the degree of competition on 
a given product market in their territory. They decide what 
obligations to impose. They decide which operators will be 
subject to those rules. The proposal from the Commission 
seek [sic] to counter-balance this decentralisation of decision 
making with strong co-ordination mechanisms to ensure 
consistency of application of the rules. The over-riding 
rationale for a regulatory framework at [the] European level 
is to ensure a minimum level of harmonisation. Similar firms 
should be subject to similar obligations in similar market 
circumstances, wherever they operate in the EU.175 
While the author intended to basically restrict the analysis to 
the state of the July 2000 proposals, it nevertheless seems use-
ful to warn that the Council (in its meeting in April 2001) has 
already shown its reluctance to follow the Commission. In its 
view, the “transparency mechanism” should run only as fol-
lows: 
The Commission may make public a detailed opinion which it 
shall communicate to the NRA concerned stating why it con-
siders that the draft measure is not compatible with Commu-
nity law. The NRA may adopt the envisaged measures after 
  
 172. Amended Interconnection Proposal, supra note 153, art. 8(2).  
 173. See Amended Framework Proposal, supra note 153, art. 7. 
 174. See id. art. 6(4)-(6). 
 175. See Verrue, supra note 160. 
 4/24/02 6:44:28 PM 
2002] EU TELECOM DEREGULATION  793 
the publication of the detailed opinion of the Commission, and 
shall communicate them to the Commission. Where the NRA 
does not follow the Commission’s opinion, it shall give its rea-
soning.176 
 
As seen from the Commission proposal which has already 
taken in the comments of the Parliament’s First Reading (al-
though not following them completely), this approach is not 
what the Commission intended. It will now largely depend on 
the Parliament’s Second Reading and if necessary, the concilia-
tion procedure to arrive at results.177  
In general, we are witnessing once again an attempt to strike 
what might be called a “dynamic balance” between centripetal 
forces, as represented by the Commission, and centrifugal 
forces, as represented by the Member States. What remains 
interesting to observe is that the instruments with which the 
Commission seeks to maintain its influence have become more 
refined, aiming at setting information and consultation duties, 
as well as defining criteria for establishing thresholds rather 
than seeking direct intervention. Closely connected to this ten-
sion between the Commission and the NRAs is the other main 
instrument for regulatory authorities: the licensing (authoriza-
tion) procedure. 
a. The Authorization Proposal 
The Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and 
of the Council on the Authorization of Electronic Communica-
tions Networks and Services (“Authorization Proposal” or 
“AP”)178 had its First Reading in the Parliament and passed the 
(Telecommunications) Council in April 2001. Observations are, 
as above, based basically on the Commission’s original AP but 
not without a glimpse at the Commission’s reflections after the 
First Reading in the Parliament.179  
  
 176. See 2340th Council Meeting, supra note 152. 
 177. For details on the European Union Co-Decision Procedure for Regula-
tions and Directives, see FISCHER, supra note 14, at 77. 
 178. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Coun-
cil on the Authorisation of Electronic Communications Networks and Ser-
vices, COM(00)386 final. 
 179. See Amended Authorization Proposal, supra note 153.   
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The Authorization Proposal sets out the general conditions of 
authorization for electronic communication services and net-
works, as defined in the FP. Authorization (licensing) is a par-
ticularly crucial area since, in practice, this is where NRAs 
leave their mark, as the Commission seems painfully aware.  
In 1992, and independently of its policy as regards a potential 
ERA, the Commission had already tried to at least introduce a 
mutual recognition system, an approach always used when 
Member States’ resistance to harmonization seems too strong. 
But the Commission failed, another example that the telecom 
regulatory process has witnessed occasional defeat.180 The Li-
censing Directive181 returned to the traditional harmonization 
approach with the intention of reducing individual licensing 
occasions,182 and as remembrance of dreams gone, it opened the 
way for one-stop-shopping procedures which, however, bundled 
the licensing decisions of NRAs only organizationally.183  
The current Authorization Proposal continues with the tradi-
tional approach by emphasizing general authorizations, har-
monizing and raising the substantive contents of such authori-
zations. Since the AP is now a “convergence proposal,” it has 
grown larger, incorporating specific sections on radio-frequency 
authorizations, thus providing an example that convergence 
can also be reached simply by combining different regulations 
under a single heading. The most crucial issue, however, is the 
fee issue. Based on unpleasant experiences, the AP approaches 
this issue in far more detail than in the old Licensing Directive 
in order to put stronger control on the Member States’ NRA fee 
policies. There is, of course, the “internal market stick” giving 
the Commission power of intervention: 
Where divergences between national charges, fees, pr ocedures 
or conditions concerning general authorisation or the grant of 
  
 180. For a description of the failure, see LAROUCHE, supra note 18, at 416 
n.450. 
 181. Parliament and Council Directive 97/13, supra note 90. 
 182. See LAROUCHE , supra note 18, at 416.  
 183. See Parliament and Council Directive 97/13, supra note 90, art. 13.  
This procedure is not restricted to Member States and is organized in the 
context of CEPT by the European Telecommunications Office (“ETO”).  These 
functions are now being carried out by the European Radiocommunications 
Office (“ERO”), located in Copenhagen, which took over all ETO functions as 
of Jan. 2001.  See CEPT Organisation, at http://www.ero.dk (last visited Mar. 
18, 2002). 
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rights of use create barriers to the internal market, the Com-
mission may adopt measures to harmonise such charges, fees, 
procedures or conditions in accordance with the procedure re-
ferred to in Article 19(3) of Directive [on a common regulatory 
framework for electronic communications networks and ser-
vices].184 
b. The Access and Interconnection Proposal 
Observations are based on the Amended Proposal for a Direc-
tive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Access 
to, and Interconnection of, Electronic Communications Net-
works and Associated Facilities.185 The general principle re-
mains that interconnection agreements may be requested, and 
are then negotiated among undertakings.186 Interconnection 
obligations may be imposed, amended and withdrawn on SMP 
operators following the procedure set up in the FP.187 Obliga-
tions may also be imposed on undertakings with SMP regard-
ing access to only specific network facilities.188 Existing inter-
connection obligations remain in operation, but the NRAs are 
required to review them taking into account the new defini-
tions of SMP.189  Interconnection itself remains based on non-
discrimination, cost-oriented pricing and transparency, and 
allows explicitly for access to specific network elements.190 Pro-
viders of conditional access systems (e.g., digital television) are 
required to offer access on fair, reasonable and non-
discriminatory terms.191 Decisions will be made according to 
market development on the basis of the comitology structure 
envisaged in the FP.  Again, in working on its common posi-
tion, the Council is trying to reduce the possible impact of the 
Commission, mostly in the area of conditional access systems. 
  
 184. Amended Authorization Proposal, supra note 153, art. 16. 
 185. Amended Interconnection Proposal, supra note 153. 
 186. See id. arts. 3-4. 
 187. See id. arts. 5, 8. 
 188. Id. art. 12. 
 189. Id. art. 7. 
 190. See id. arts. 9-12.  
 191. See Amended Interconnection Proposal, supra note 153, art. 6. 
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c. The Universal Service and Users’ Rights Proposal 
Observations are based on the Commission Proposal for a Di-
rective of the European Parliament and of the Council on Uni-
versal Service and Users’ Rights Relating to Electronic Com-
munications Networks and Services (“Universal Service Pro-
posal” or “USP”).192  The USP addresses the traditional univer-
sal service obligations. It includes regulations on the choice of 
designated universal service operators by the Member States, 
including new provisions on cost assessment and recovery of 
costs by these operators.193 Member States must find the most 
efficient way to attribute universal service, opening the oppor-
tunity to all undertakings and using allocation mechanisms for 
part or all universal service obligations either by tender or auc-
tion.194 There is a specific requirement for the Commission to 
review the scope of universal service obligations195 and a pre-
scribed procedure for this task.196 The rather narrow scope of 
universal service according to the USP, if compared to the 
U.S.,197 is comprised of: 
[A]ll reasonable requests for connection to the public tele-
phone network at a fixed location and for access to publicly 
available telephone services at a fixed location are met by at 
least one operator. . . . The connection provided shall be capa-
ble of allowing users to make and receive local, national and 
international telephone calls, facsimile communications and 
data communications, at data rates that are sufficient to 
permit Internet access.”198 
Further requirements include: (1) adequate directory enquiry 
services and directories;199 (2) if so decided by the NRA, public 
  
 192. See Universal Service Proposal, supra note 136. 
 193. See id. arts. 3-13. 
 194. Id. art. 8. 
 195. Id. art. 15. 
 196. Id. at annex V. 
 197. For example, the European definition does not comprise the provision 
of broadband communications for health care establishment, nor internet 
access for schools.  The Commission is of the opinion that such services 
should be financed by the appropriate government departments and not by 
the telecommunications sector, although the proposal would allow for direct 
government payments also within the framework of telecommunications. 
 198. Universal Service Proposal, supra note 136, art. 4. 
 199. Id. art. 5. 
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payphones with the possibility of free emergency calls;200 (3) 
special measures for disabled and specific needs users;201 and 
(4) special provisions for users with low incomes or with special 
needs, including user enabling techniques for cost control.202 
The quality of services is to be monitored by the NRAs.203 
Cost recovery can be obtained through special funds or from 
general government budgets. There is no longer a universal 
service surcharge on interconnection prices.204  In view of 
Community enlargement and the ensuing wide variety of mar-
ket situations and different levels of service quality, special 
attention is again necessary for undertakings with SMP.  
These undertakings can be submitted to retail tariff regulation 
by their NRAs in order to prevent distortions of competition. 
The NRAs have to observe all procedural obligations, informa-
tion and publication duties as prescribed for actions in relation 
to undertakings with SMP in the Framework Proposal.205 
In the general spirit of EU consumer protection, the Univer-
sal Service Proposal relies on information duties in the interest 
of the consumer rather than on direct intervention. The infor-
mation requirements of the USP, however, seem either obvious 
or of rather low quality;206 tariffs and contractual information 
are to be made only sufficiently transparent.207 Yet, while 
rather grandly including the promotion of interests of Euro-
pean citizens among the tasks of NRAs, the FP had already 
restricted the means of “requiring transparency of tariffs and 
conditions for using publicly available electronic communica-
tions services; and . . . addressing the needs of specific social 
groups, in particular disabled users.”208 
Other information related clauses of the USP refer to infor-
mation on the quality of services.209 There are further con-
sumer protection elements in the USP which relate to specific 
issues such as the assurance that all equipment sold in the EU 
  
 200. Id. art. 6. 
 201. Id. art. 7. 
 202. Id. arts. 9-10. 
 203. Id. art. 11. 
 204. Universal Service Proposal, supra note 136, arts. 12-13. 
 205. Id. art. 16. 
 206. See id. art. 17. 
 207. Id. art. 18. 
 208. See Amended Framework Proposal, supra note 153, art. 7(4). 
 209. Universal Service Proposal, supra note 136, art. 19. 
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for reception of digital television is technically compatible with 
the relevant European standard,210 — an assurance which also 
demonstrates that some of these regulations have an astonish-
ing concern for detail, in contrast, it seems, to the relative im-
portance and relevance of the issue.211 Further measures com-
prise: (1) the right to operator assisted calls; (2) a single direc-
tory in a fair and non-discriminatory manner;212 (3) the single 
European emergency call number (“112”);213 (4) the existing 
requirement of a single international access code (“00”) and the 
obligation of operators to handle calls using the new European 
regional code (“3883”);214 (5) the obligation for all public access 
  
 210. See id. art. 20. 
 211. See, e.g., id. at annex VI.  It specifies under which conditions these 
assurances apply:  
 
Any analogue television set with an integral screen of visible di-
agonal greater than 42 cm which is put on the market for sale or 
rent in the Community shall be fitted with at least one open inter-
face socket (as standardised by a recognised European standardisa-
tion body) permitting simple connection of peripherals, especially 
additional decoders and digital receivers.  
Any digital television set with an integral screen of visible diago-
nal greater than 30 cm which is put on the market for sale or rent in 
the Community shall be fitted with at least one open interface socket 
(either standardised by a recognised European standardisation body 
or conforming to an industry-wide specification) permitting simple 
connection of peripherals, and able to pass all the elements of a digi-
tal television signal. Apart from video and audio streams, this in-
cludes conditional access information, the full application pro-
gramme interface (API) command set of the connected devices, ser-
vice information and copy protection information.  
Id.  Such detail is, of course, less astonishing when remembering the EU 
industrial policy tradition. 
 212. Id. art. 21.  
 213. This includes the already existing requirement of emergency services 
to be available free of charge, and adds a provision stipulating that caller 
location information be made available to emergency authorities for such 
calls.  Id. art. 22. 
 214. Universal Service Proposal, supra note 136, art. 23.  The number 
“3883” will be a “pan-European” country code for subscribers wishing to es-
tablish a “European identity,” or rather a “CEPT identity,” since the code will 
apply to subscribers in the fifteen EU Member States (Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom) and in Bul-
garia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Croatia, Norway, Poland, Slovenia, the 
Slovak Republic and Switzerland.  Id. 
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operators to provide additional services (tone dialing and item-
ized billing) to all citizens (and not just obligations only for 
SMP or designated universal service operators), again, how-
ever, NRAs are given the option not to require such obligations 
if they do not consider them necessary;215 and (6) the obligation 
of number portability to mobile operators.216 
The proposal also confirms the continuing need for leased 
lines and other mandatory services as already regulated in Di-
rective 92/44 (as amended by Directive 97/51).217  The Univer-
sal Service Proposal contains a new provision which ensures 
proportionate compensation to network operators that bear 
must carry obligations in relation to public service broadcast-
ing. One of the few “convergence” rules, it states in full: 
 
“Must carry” obligations 
1. Member States may impose “must carry” obligations, for 
the transmission of specified radio and television broadcasts, 
on undertakings under their jurisdiction providing electronic 
communications networks established for the distribution of 
radio or television broadcasts to the public. Such obligations 
shall only be imposed where they are necessary to meet 
clearly defined general interest objectives and shall be propor-
tionate, transparent and limited in time. 
2. Member States shall ensure that the undertakings sub-
ject to “must carry” obligations receive appropriate compensa-
tion on reasonable, transparent and non -discriminatory terms 
taking into account the network capacity required. 218 
The last chapter of the USP deals with procedure (consultation 
by national regulatory authorities with user and consumer 
groups before adopting national measures).219  
d. The Data Protection Proposal 
The issue of data protection was dealt with in the working 
papers, which were part of the consultation processes after the 
  
 215. Id. art. 24. 
 216. Id. art. 25.  This does not apply between mobile and fixed network 
operators. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. art. 26. 
 219. Universal Service Proposal, supra note 136, arts. 29-36. 
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1999 Communications Review,220 and later became part of the 
July 2000 package. Observations are based on the Proposal for 
a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
Concerning the Processing of Personal Data and the Protection 
of Privacy in the Electronic Communications Sector (“Data Pro-
tection Proposal” or “DPP”).221  
As known from other contexts, in 1995 the EU enacted Coun-
cil Directive 95/46, a general directive on data protection cover-
ing the private sector and the public sector in as far as there is 
EU regulatory competence.222  In 1997, the EU also enacted 
Council Directive 97/66, a special sector directive on telecom-
munications.223 In both cases, the Commission had to open in-
fringement proceedings against certain Member States since 
they had not transformed the directives into national law 
within the time frame set by those directives.  Some of these 
proceedings are still pending.  There was no intention of intro-
ducing large changes to the existing situation created by Direc-
tives 95/46 and 97/66.  It is not without irony that the intention 
of this proposal to become (more?) technologically neutral was 
induced by changes in the technology.  
The Data Protection Proposal puts the intended regulations 
under the umbrella of the framework proposal definition and 
appends existing regulation accordingly.  Since Article 6 (“traf-
fic data”) of Directive 97/66, for example, only referred to 
  
 220. See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, DIRECTORATE-GENERAL INFORMATION 
SOCIETY, DOC. NO. INSFO A/1DG, COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES: POLICY AND 
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK (Apr. 27, 2000). 
 221. Data Protection Proposal, supra note 137.  See also  Parliament and 
Council Directive 97/66, supra note 137.  As discussed previously, the pro-
posal is currently under consideration in the Council for developing a Com-
mon Position.  The First Reading in Parliament is expected in September 
2001.  The procedure is unusual but possible. Normally, it is the Council who 
reacts to the position of the Parliament with a Common Position, as in the 
other elements of the new regulatory package.  The Chairman of the Commit-
tee on Citizen’s Freedoms and Rights, Justice and Home Affairs of the Par-
liament has already indicated that the amendments of the Council are 
unlikely to find acceptance in the First Reading of the Parliament.  See 
sources cited supra note 153.  The Council recognizes that this package is 
politically, the most difficult element of the package, and since it is the politi-
cal intention of the Council to see through the whole of the “new regulatory 
package” on a single date before the end of 2001, there is a certain interest in 
speeding up procedures.  Id. 
 222. Parliament and Council Directive 95/46, supra note 166. 
 223. Id. 
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“calls,”224 adjustments are made to relate these and other 
clauses to “the transmission of a communication.”225 Since 
technical and organizational opportunities as regards traffic 
data have also increased, there is now an express possibility to 
allow for processing of this traffic data with the informed con-
sent of the subscriber.  Traffic data, however, seems to become 
a very controversial issue in the current political debate, if not 
the most controversial in the new regulatory package. Law en-
forcement interests seek extended periods of data retention on 
traffic data, as well as access to that data at telecom undertak-
ings.226 There is currently resistance from the Commission, 
from some Member States and from telecom undertakings, 
since Directive 97/66 had affirmed that traffic data may only be 
kept for billing purposes.227 
Location data — which will become more important in view 
of mobile-commerce or “m-commerce” — is strictly speaking, 
part of traffic data and regulated as such by Directive 97/66. 
But in view of this information becoming more precise, an ex-
plicit article appeared to be necessary.  This article, however, 
only repeats the basic principle of directive 97/66: subscribers 
should have the choice (of temporarily disabling the location 
device — similar to “caller ID”) and should give prior con-
sent.228 This does not alter already existing exemptions — 
again in the context of caller identification — in emergency 
situations and by Member States’ legislation for law enforce-
ment purposes.229  
In view of technological changes and new social and economic 
uses, the basic assumption of Directive 97/66 — that a central 
directory service should be maintained with a default rule of 
entering subscribers into such a directory — can no longer be 
  
 224. Parliament and Council Directive 97/66, supra note 137, art. 6(1). 
 225. Data Protection Proposal, supra note 137, art. 6(1) (emphasis added). 
 226. Work is progressing on a resolution to replace the Council Resolution 
of 17 January 1995 on the Lawful Interception of Telecommunications, 1996 
O.J. (C 329) 1, which was not published until the end of 1996.  For the cur-
rent status of this legislation, see Council Resolution 9194/01 on Law En-
forcement Operational Needs with Respect to Public Telecommunications and 
Services, June 20, 2001, at http://www.ue.eu.int. 
 227. See Parliament and Council Directive 97/66, supra note 137, art. 6(2). 
 228. See Data Protection Proposal, supra note 137, art. 9. 
 229. Id. arts. 10, 15. 
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maintained. It will now be the choice of the subscriber to decide 
in which directories to appear and with what information.230 
Another issue likely to remain controversial is the protection 
against unsolicited calls. Here the Data Protection Proposal 
has, while extending the definition, given up the idea of techno-
logical neutrality once again: for “automated calling systems 
without human intervention (automatic calling machines), fac-
simile machines (fax) or electronic mail for the purposes of di-
rect marketing,” the default rule is now that such communica-
tion is forbidden unless the subscriber has consented.231 As re-
gards the other forms of “communication,” the opt-out or opt-in 
choice is left to regulation in the Member States.232 And this 
only applies to natural persons — as regards other entities, 
“Member States shall also ensure . . . that the legitimate inter-
ests of subscribers other than natural persons with regard to 
unsolicited communications are sufficiently protected.”233 One 
reason for controversy is that the Electric Commerce Directive 
already provides for a Member State’s solution for e-mail. 234 
Finally, the Data Protection Proposal addresses the possibili-
ties of privacy enhancing technologies.235 The DPP suggests 
that the Commission might propose measures to ensure that 
terminal equipment incorporates the necessary safeguards to 
guarantee the protection of personal data and privacy of users 
and subscribers.236  
3. Summary 
Considering all these content descriptions, what then are the 
main characteristics of change initiated by the 1999 Communi-
cations Review, or more precisely, what are the main charac-
  
 230. Id. art. 12. 
 231. Id. art. 13(1). 
 232. Id. art. 13(2). 
 233. Id. art. 13(3). 
 234. See Parliament and Council Directive 2000/31, supra note 116, art. 7. 
 235. For a discussion of these technologies, see Herbert Burkert, Privacy-
Enhancing Technologies: Typology, Critique, Vision, in TECHNOLOGY AND 
PRIVACY : THE NEW LANDSCAPE 125 (1998). 
 236. See Parliament and Council Directive 1999/5 of 9 March 1999 on Radio 
Equipment and Telecommunications Equipment and the Mutual Recognition 
of Their Conformity, 1999 O.J. (L 91) 10; Council Decision 87/95 of 22 De-
cember 1986 on Standardization in the Field of Information Technology and 
Telecommunications, 1987 O.J. (L 36) 31.  
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teristics of the proposed changes that still have to emerge from 
the rule making process and be implemented in national law?: 
(1) After initial hesitation, the EU has addressed the local 
loop issue as the most pressing structural problem of telecom-
munication markets with impressive decisiveness: unbundled 
access to the local loop, either exclusively or shared, has been 
implemented, with the basic principles of non-discrimination, 
co-location and cost-orientation on fair, reasonable and non-
discriminatory terms and with the requirement of standard 
publicized offers for undertakings with SMPs. 
(2)  With regard to the relationship between the Commission 
and the NRAs, there is an attempt, although somewhat cached 
in regulatory speech, to arrive at better co-ordination and to 
ensure faster and more comprehensive alignment with the 
rules of EU telecommunications regulations. Since this issue is 
essential for the future of the regulatory landscape in Europe, 
it will receive further scrutiny in Part IV below. 
(3) The new regulatory package attempts to reflect conver-
gence. The approach seems to be more one of verbal regulatory 
technique than of full functional integration: definitions are 
extended, articles on specific electronic (mass) media develop-
ments are added rather than integrated, not always necessarily 
reflecting the intention of a more technology neutral approach. 
The package does not address contents, except when explicitly 
opening the possibility of must carry obligations. 
(4) The basic addressee of ex ante intervention, the under-
taking with SMP, will now be defined in closer harmony with 
the definitions of general competition law intervention, al-
though not necessarily exactly in the same manner and not 
necessarily with more clarity. 
(5)  The main intention of the authorization proposal is to 
achieve better control over the varying fee practices in the 
Member States. 
(6) The access and interconnection proposal mainly ensures 
that definitions and terminology are adjusted to the new 
framework and the convergence aim. 
(7) The same seems to apply to the more ex post oriented 
proposals of universal service and users’ rights, except perhaps 
that review procedures for financing models by NRAs have to 
take place at more regular intervals.  Certain service features 
are now expanded into the area of mobile telephony.  There are 
no fundamental changes to the definition of universal services. 
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(8) Finally, in the area of data protection, we again see ad-
justments of terminology to the broader scope of the conver-
gence philosophy, while old conflicts continue, albeit now per-
haps with a more data protection minded Commission. 
In all, there is no basic change observable. Whether the regu-
latory hand of the Commission will be lighter or heavier on 
NRAs is yet to be decided or rather experienced.  The regula-
tory material now appears better structured and organized, 
and it might facilitate regulatory orientation for NRAs, under-
takings, users and consumers.  This would then be the general 
description of the emerging post-deregulatory landscape for 
telecommunications in the EU, with one exception: in the ma-
terial examined, the original plans analyzed, the pre-1999 
Communications Review spirit remembered, the discussions 
watched and the exchanges followed, there seem to be indica-
tions of a deeper change, a change that does not necessarily 
originate in developments of the telecommunications markets, 
but one that might eventually influence the outcome of the ten-
sions between the Commission and the Member States’ au-
thorities, or rather between the Commission and the Member 
States’ view on the role of their NRAs.  
IV. A SECOND LOOK: A “NATURAL HISTORY OF REGULATION” OR 
THE “UNIQUE EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE” 
There are, of course, many other questions to be asked about 
the role of transparency and the involvement of consumers and 
users outside the traditional structures of the current built-up 
of regulatory agencies. There is enough writing on the wall; 
even the imperfect and perhaps soon obsolete Internet Corpo-
ration for Names and Numbers model is casting its shadow. To 
this day, there is no comprehensive comparative study on na-
tional regulatory authorities that focuses on the transparency 
of procedures or the integration of public interest representa-
tions in their organizational and procedural structure. 237 
  
 237. This approach would, of course, also be necessary on the level of EU 
institutions. In the area of transparency, there have been considerable efforts 
by Community institutions over the last years. See, e.g., Parliament Council 
Regulation 1049/2001, supra note 75.  Against the general trend of skepti-
cism, the EU has enforced its attempts to address its legitimacy, governance 
and acceptance problems, again, however, mainly in view of preparing accep-
tance for yet further treaty changes and, of course, the enlargement.  See 
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We, however, shall put ourselves to a less ambitious task.  
The general understanding of the changes described above, 
taking the 1999 Communications Review as the watershed, 
often summarizes as if they provided a sort of “natural history 
of telecommunications regulations” where one moves from the 
natural monopoly to breaking this monopoly, taming the in-
cumbents, ensuring access and entry and gradually making 
regulation disappear.  This Article has shown these develop-
ments — as unfinished as they are and as limited to a particu-
lar period in EU telecommunications regulations — in some 
detail because they may answer the long-standing question 
whether the development towards the post-deregulatory land-
scape, towards regulation with a lighter touch, may indeed be 
read as a natural development where the Commission and the 
Member States only had to make one effort in the early 1980’s 
to give the clauses on services in the general economic interest 
a push.  
A. Revisiting the NRA and ERA Issue 
Already, the current situation does not reflect such easiness, 
if we review the previous account.  The local loop problem had 
to be addressed by a regulation, the strongest instrument in 
EU telecommunications law. The Commission still carries on 
with a large number of breach of treaty procedures against the 
Member States who are still battling with the pre-1999 Com-
munications Review regulatory package.  The issue of an ERA 
appeared, and seems to have disappeared again. The relation-
ship between the NRA and the Commission is characterized as 
critical in the new regulatory package. The universal service 
issue seems to stand fairly high on current agendas, while in 
the early telecommunications policy documents the issue was 
hardly evident.  Telecommunications privacy does not have a 
clear cut profile. And there is a highly critical debate on the 
regulatory package as such, and neither in the Council nor the 
Parliament do all elements of the package receive an equally 
easy ride. 
The issue of an ERA seems to show most clearly the first 
cracks of deeper tectonic changes. At minimum, the outside 
  
generally Commission of the European Communities, European Governance: 
A White Paper, COM(01)428 final.   
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observer will see that the Commission’s (and the Parliament’s) 
toying with the idea of an ERA was at least influenced by the 
example of the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”).  
EU competition law in general has been driven by the Ameri-
can example, and to a large extent was designed by Americans, 
even if the empirical and historical evidence is, while basically 
acknowledged, occasionally downplayed.238 Would it be useful 
to have an institution like the FCC on the European level, 
eventually as a counterpart in the “regulatory world series”? 
Although there are a number of constitutional problems in 
setting up a regulatory agency of some sort on the EU level, or 
delegating rule-making power from existing institutions to 
such an institution,239 the issue of an ERA has always been and 
continues to be a strong wish, although it is not always clear 
who the wisher is. The ERA theme certainly provides a leitmo-
tiv of the regulatory developments described so far and also 
echoes the old (albeit not always clearly expressed) double-bind 
situation in which Europe looks at the United States: always a 
dream and always a fear, always an attraction and always a 
repulsion. 
With or without that American-centered addition, the notion 
of an ERA has been put forward by the Parliament at various 
occasions.240 Even the “euro-centric world open,” — then fa-
mous (and now somewhat lesser referred to as such) — 
“Bangemann Group” had suggested such an authority in 1994, 
at a time when reference to a “High Level Group” consisting 
purely of industrialists was still considered to bring enlight-
ened guidance to European policies. 241 
While it was the Parliament that put the issue on the agenda 
of the 1999 Communication Review, the Commission itself had 
undertaken various studies on its own to test the ground.242 
The actual position of the Commission remained difficult to 
  
 238. For a history of European integration and the influence of U.S. compe-
tition law, see DAVID J. GERBER, LAW AND COMPETITION IN TWENTIETH 
CENTURY EUROPE: PROTECTING PROMETHEUS  334 (1998). 
 239. For further detail, see Yataganas, supra note 125.  
 240. For further references to EU action in this field, see LAROUCHE, supra  
note 18, at 414. 
 241. Robert Queck, The Future of National Telecommunications Regulatory 
Authorities, in 2 THE JOURNAL OF POLICY , REGULATION AND STRATEGY FOR 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS INFORMATION AND MEDIA 251, 259 (2000). 
 242. For further detail, see LAROUCHE , supra note 18, at 415. 
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ascertain. There are different currents of opinion in the Com-
mission, and which of these currents or which mix of those cur-
rents see the light of an official document is the result of com-
plex interactions within and among the General Directorates. 
In a statement in the EC Competition Policy Newsletter, a 
Commission official from the Competition General Directorate 
elaborated on the issue, indicating that a commissioned study 
did favor a specific EU institutional arrangement short of an 
ERA.243 The official, of course, remained non-committal and 
emphasized, as usual, “subsidiarity” and “co-operation.”244 In 
the Green Paper on Convergence, there were, however, some 
comments alarming for those who had been skeptical of a new 
European authority. Since these comments are a very good ex-
ample of “Commission speak” and the way the Commission 
deals with critical points, a quote seems illustrative. Appropri-
ately, the Commission starts with a bow to subsidiarity: 
In looking at the options for a possible future regulatory 
model, account must be taken of the way in which responsi-
bilities will continue to be shared between the Community 
and Member States and within Member States, between na-
tional, regional and sometimes local authorities. From a 
Community perspective, the EC Treaty defines on the basis of 
subsidiarity those areas in which the Community has a role to 
play. Such action may be taken, assuming it is an area for 
which the Community is competent, “only if and in so far as 
the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently 
achieved by the Member States and can, therefore, by reason 
of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better 
achieved by the Community.”245 
The Commission then takes the decisive turn: 
Given the regional and global nature of many of the services 
being delivered, that subsidiarity test may be met. Diverse 
national approaches may harm rather than promote users’ in-
terests, could undermine the diversity which the internal 
market offers, and may well introduce distortions which fa-
  
 243. See Alexander Schaub, Competition in the Telecoms Sector, EC  
COMPETITION POLICY NEWSLETTER, Apr. 1, 1996, at 1, 6-7, available at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/speeches/text/sp1996_030_en.html. 
 244. Id. 
 245. Green Paper on Convergence, supra note 40, at 31. 
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vour the establishment of production facilities in regions 
where a lighter regime applies.246 
Not surprisingly, some of the questions which the Commis-
sion put forward in the Green Paper on Convergence on this 
issue may be seen by some as leading questions. However, 
something else happened. By explicitly or at least implicitly 
turning telecommunications regulation into a convergence is-
sue, and by proposing — again mostly between the lines — to 
take the spirit of telecommunications liberalization into mass 
media, the Green Paper on Convergence helped to create new 
alliances of opposition mainly between the public service tele-
communications operators, or rather the “incumbents” and the 
providers of public service broadcasting. Traditionally, these 
broadcasters still have a high political standing and consider-
able political impact in at least some Member States. And their 
regulatory authorities started to see issues they shared with 
telecommunications regulatory authorities, but not necessarily 
in the same way as the Green Paper on Convergence seemed to 
insinuate.  
Nor was the pressure without reaction from the telecommu-
nications NRAs. Apart from the usual pressures and exigen-
cies, many of these authorities see themselves under a double 
weight. On the national level, they have to justify their exis-
tence as special regulatory agencies, in addition to general 
regulators of competition. On the EU level, they have to defend 
their existence as national authorities. The reaction to the 
Green Paper on Convergence insinuations regarding a need for 
an ERA was then, it seemed, sufficiently reserved to lead to the 
withdrawal of the ERA idea in the 1999 Communications Re-
view. Another way to confront the pressure for an ERA model 
has been to show, at least symbolically, the inherently imper-
fect logic of such an authority. It is imperfect because the proc-
ess of European unity is still far from complete, and any au-
thority on the EU level would then be asked how European it 
really is. Consequently, as one is almost inclined to assume, 
NRAs from the EU joined with NRAs from the European Free 
Trade Association (“EFTA”) states247 and had formed the Inde-
  
 246. Id. 
 247. European Free Trade Association, at http://www.efta.int/structure 
/main/index.htm. Member States are Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and 
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pendent Regulators Group, slightly emphasizing, perhaps, the 
qualification independent. 
But something else had also changed. By now, the general 
climate had become more skeptical towards liberalization, par-
ticularly since the positive, even if only secondary economic 
effect of liberalization was not yet evident. Unemployment re-
mained the main economic issue in the EU; euro-skepticism 
was growing. December 1998 saw the refusal of the EU budget 
by the Parliament, and in January 1999, the “Commission cri-
sis” — the vote of non-confidence by the Parliament which 
forced the demission of the Commission —– followed.248 And 
most important: The new treaty — the Treaty of Amsterdam — 
which had already been in the making at least since October 
1997, saw its ratification ensured only in the first half of 1999, 
and not without difficulties.  
So, with the 1999 Communications Review, the wording for 
the relationship between the Commission and the Member 
States’ NRAs had changed significantly; there was no longer 
any talk of an ERA, and the key word now became “coopera-
tion.”249  However, against the current political background 
described above, NRAs may suspiciously look at cooperation for 
signs of a functional equivalent of an ERA, even if the term is 
no longer fashionable and the window of opportunity for cen-
tripetal forces in this area may well be closed for some time. As 
we shall see, this is not the only change which, while not neces-
sarily introduced with the new regulatory package, will never-
theless have its impact on that package. 
B. The Great Climate Change: The Return of the Public Service 
and the Consumer? 
A more fundamental change seems to be underway, although 
it is far from certain what the result will be. In his speech in 
the Summer of 2001, from which this Article quoted several 
times, Robert Verrue answered the question “[w]hy have we 
made these proposals?” by giving, inter alia, as the main objec-
  
Switzerland.  The EU and EFTA (except Switzerland) cooperate on the basis 
of the Agreement on the European Economic Area of 1992.  Id.   
 248. See Peter Schwartz, The Failed Vote of No-Confidence in the European 
Parliament, at http://www.wsws.org/articles/1999/ jan1999/parl-j2l.shtml 
(Jan. 21, 1999). 
 249. Queck, supra note 241, at 259.  
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tives: “(1) to benefit the citizen; (2) to promote, sustain and 
deepen an open and competitive market; [and] (3) to consoli-
date the EU’s internal market.”250 
While this, at first glance, is restating the obvious, the rank-
ing of the objectives is still remarkable.  The author recalled in 
Part III.A.5., supra, that the notion of the universal service had 
entered the regulatory debate at a relatively late stage, only 
shortly before the complete liberalization of the market. This 
Article has also shown that only about thirty years after its 
entry into force, the interpretation of the then EC Treaty Arti-
cle 90 had changed somewhat dramatically. And it has also 
seemed as if this change has largely been accepted in the 
Member States and in the perception of the general public, to 
the extent that the general public was following these devel-
opments at all, due to the disappointment with the level of pub-
lic service and the changing perception of the natural monop-
oly.  
Recall, however, the increasing influence of the Parliament 
due to changes in the general power structure of the EU. Since 
the introduction of direct elections (only in 1979), the co-
decision procedure (1993) and the enlargement of this proce-
dure (1999), the Parliament was moving closer to the “end 
user” and consumer (and as a side effect, is also now more ex-
posed to temptations from lobbying).  It was the Parliament 
which started to re-emphasize public interest considerations 
and the importance of services in the general economic interest. 
In telecommunications, the Parliament had simply to pick up 
those cards which the Commission and the Member States had 
not yet sufficiently played, because they were to leave the pub-
lic telephony service until the very last.  
The Commission and the Council had appeased the re-
discovery of the public interest partly by introducing universal 
service parts into the various directives and partly (but mainly 
due to other pressures, incentives and  developments)251 by em-
phasizing data protection more strongly.  As so often in Euro-
pean politics, and as exemplified with the ERA issue above, 
  
 250. Verrue, supra note 160. 
 251. It should be remembered that it had taken the EU more than twenty 
years to move from the first discussions of data protection issues in the then 
not yet directly elected European Parliament (1974) to the Data Protection 
Directive.  
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legal policy developments cannot be explained by looking sim-
ply at application areas and application specific developments. 
Again, one must recall general political developments. There 
have been other players emphasizing public interest and public 
services. There had been national developments, most strongly 
signaled first by the end of the Thatcher administration and 
later with the Conservative government in the U.K. by 1997. 
Although this did not lead to a recognizable change of the Brit-
ish position on telecommunications, these developments were 
perceived as symbolic indicators of change.  
As noted above, unemployment remained an important issue 
in public debate. This is not the place to expand on unemploy-
ment and telecommunications liberalization and their complex 
interrelations; reference is only made in view of the changes in 
public opinion and its view on the role and responsibility of the 
EU.  Furthermore, certainly since 1989, and well before the 
European crisis years already referred to, the end of East/West 
confrontations favored centrifugal tendencies in the EU which 
gained further momentum as a counterbalance to the intention 
of the EU to become more integrated in the area of foreign and 
military policy. 
Last but not least, end users’ views gradually changed as 
well. Changes brought by, or at least with, liberalization had 
been welcome. Services had improved. Prices had gone down on 
long-distance calls, but they had also gone up for local calls and 
continue to do so. Choice had increased, but the burden of 
choice had become heavier and information costs had increased 
as well, leaving the consumer with an undercurrent of feeling 
that there might always be a better choice than the one made 
(and ironically because of these choices), which seems to lead to 
a lingering feeling of being trapped, if not cheated.252 
The Commission, of course, has not and will not stop at tele-
communications. Other areas are undergoing similar changes: 
energy and water, public banking and public transport and  
(tentatively) public radio and television.  This multi-front ap-
  
 252. EOS Gallup Europe, The European Commission: The Situation of 
Telecommunication Services in the Regions of the European Union, at 
http://europa.eu.int/ISPO/infosoc/telecompolicy/en/EOStudy/ 
Resid/accueil.htm (last visited Mar. 18, 2002) (based on over 44,000 house-
hold interviews in 130 regions within the fifteen Member States, in conjunc-
tion with a survey of 7500 small companies).  
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proach of the Commission with or without direct support from 
the Council has also generated  — as already shown in the re-
actions to the Green Paper on Convergence — a multi-front 
opposition. 
With its general loss of appeal, the EU also seemed to have 
lost control over its regulatory playing field. The need for insti-
tutional reform, and the then upcoming Treaty of Amsterdam 
in particular, allowed players to carry their sectoral concerns to 
other levels.  Players could choose to take the specific issue to 
the national or to the European level, they could choose to turn 
the specific issue into a general issue or they could choose a 
combination thereof.253 This approach was strongly empha-
sized, for one, by the French government.254 Also, the European 
courts increasingly seemed to have rediscovered the charm of 
services of a general economic interest and specific state in-
volvement.255 So, in European politics, concessions for services 
in the general economic interest had to be made. The willing-
ness to make such concessions was expressed in the Commis-
sion Communication on Services of General Interest in 
Europe256 and in a 2000 update to the Communication.257 Fur-
thermore, due to changes in the Treaty of Amsterdam, the EC 
Treaty now contains a specific article:  
Article 16 (ex Article 7d) 
Without prejudice to Articles 73, 86 and 87, and given the 
place occupied by services of general economic interest in the 
shared values of the Union as well as their role in promoting 
  
 253. As regards these multi-player, multi-level politics, see generally Adri-
enne Héritier, The Politics of Public Services in European Regulation, in PRE-
PRINTS AUS DER MAX-PLANCK-PROJEKTSGRUPPE RECHT DER 
GEMEINSSCHAFTSGÜTER (2001).  
 254. The account provided by Héritier, id. at 11, slightly overemphasizes 
the impact of French developments, most likely due to the source material 
used.  
 255. See, e.g., Case T-106/95, Fédération Française des Sociétés d’Assur-
ances (FFSA) & Others v. Commission, 1997 E.C.R. II-229; Case C-392/92, 
Municipality of Almelo and Others v. Energiebedrijfljsselmij NV, 1994 E.C.R. 
I-1447; Case T-32/93, Ladbroke Racing Ltd. v. Commission, 1994 E.C.R. II-
1015; Case C-320/91, Criminal Proceedings Against Paul Corbeau, 1993 
E.C.R. I-2565. 
 256. See Services of General Interest, supra note 41.  
 257. See Communication from the Commission, Services of General Inter-
est in Europe, COM(00)580 final [hereinafter Services of General Interest 
2000]. 
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social and territorial cohesion, the Community and the Mem-
ber States, each within their respective powers and within the 
scope of application of this Treaty, shall take care that such 
services operate on the basis of principles and conditions 
which enable them to fulfil their missions.258 
And public broadcasting, in particular, found special recogni-
tion in the Protocol on the System of Public Broadcasting in the 
Member States: 
THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES, 
CONSIDERING that the system of public broadcasting in 
the Member States is directly related to the democratic, social 
and cultural needs of each society and to the need to preserve 
media pluralism, 
HAVE AGREED UPON the following interpretative provi-
sions, which shall be annexed to the Treaty establishing the 
European Community, 
The provisions of the Treaty establishing the European 
Community shall be without prejudice to the competence of 
Member States to provide for the funding of public service 
broadcasting insofar as such funding is granted to broadcast-
ing organisations for the fulfilment of the public service remit 
as conferred, defined and organised by each Member State, 
and insofar as such funding does not affect trading conditions 
and competition in the Community to an extent which would 
be contrary to the common interest, while the realisation of 
the remit of that public service shall be taken into account.259 
EC Treaty Article 16 remains rather guarded and the Com-
munication on Services of General Interest sounds rather cau-
tious, and defensive, particularly the 2000 amendment.260 All 
these developments are indications that the tone has changed 
and that the burden of argumentation may be shifting. Re-
cently, services of general economic interest have even found 
their place in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU: 
Article 36 
  
 258. EC TREATY art. 16. 
 259. Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the 
Treaties Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts - 
Protocol Annexed to the Treaty of the European Community - Protocol on the 
System of Public Broadcasting in the Member States, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 109, 
109. 
 260. See generally EC TREATY art. 16; Services of General Interest 2000, 
supra note 257. 
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Access to services of general economic interest 
The Union recognises and respects access to services of 
general economic interest as provided for in national laws and 
practices, in accordance with the Treaty establishing the 
European Community, in order to promote the social and ter-
ritorial coh esion of the Union.261 
Furthermore, consumer protection has gained considerable 
momentum.  Again quoting from the EC Treaty where, since 
the changes introduced with the Treaty of Amsterdam, con-
sumer protection now has its own title:  
TITLE XIV (ex Title XI) 
CONSUMER PROTECTION 
Article 153 (ex Article 129a) 
1. In order to promote the interests of consumers and to en-
sure a high level of consumer protection, the Community shall 
contribute to protecting the health, safety and economic in-
terests of consumers, as well as to promoting their right to in-
formation, education and to organise themselves in order to 
safeguard their interests.  
2. Consumer protection requirements shall be taken into 
account in defining and implementing other Community poli-
cies and activities.262 
It should be remembered in this context that it was only in 
1995 that consumer protection was seen as worthy of receiving 
its own General Directorate.  Again the Charter of Fundamen-
tal Rights reads: “Union policies shall ensure a high level of 
consumer protection.”263 
Finally, consumer protection has gained an even higher po-
litical standing against the background of yet another “Com-
mission crisis,” this time in the area of agriculture. The reports 
on the implementation of the regulatory tools in telecommuni-
cations become, in spite of the ever increasing annexes, more 
concise.  Unfortunately, but for obvious reasons, they empha-
size quantitative data or approaches where qualitative state-
ments are quantitatively operationalized.264 But, in the new 
spirit of consumer orientation, even these reports can be sur-
  
 261. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 36, 2000 
O.J. (C 364) 1, 17 [hereinafter Charter of Fundamental Rights]. 
 262. EC TREATY art. 153(1)-(2). 
 263. Charter of Fundamental Rights, supra note 261, art. 38. 
 264. For the most recent data, see Sixth Report, supra note 95. 
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prisingly blunt when assessing or trying to assess the current 
situation of consumer protection in telecommunications: 
There is still little evidence of a systematic effort at [the] na-
tional level to monitor the protection of consumers and the 
promotion of users’ interests as regards telecommunications 
services. While institutional arrangements vary from country 
to country, there appears to be a disappointingly low level of 
coordination between NRAs and other agencies responsible 
for consumer protection. This makes it difficult to discern par-
ticular trends or problems at [the] EU level, even in relation 
to the services and quality of service indicators the use of 
which is obligatory under the EC fram ework.265 
In sum, the climate is changing. It is against the background 
of these changes that the new regulatory package will have to 
be re-read and eventually implemented.  
C. Conluding Observation: On Comparison and Uniqueness 
The subject of the post-deregulatory landscape invites or in-
sinuates at least comparison. To compare is a deliberate act in 
which one is prepared to reduce differences, to move towards 
generalizations to reach at least some common ground for com-
parison. Emphasizing the specifics of the EU environment and 
of the European approach was driven not so much by an at-
tempt to avoid comparison or to neglect common challenges 
and common responses. Rather, this Article has attempted to 
introduce some of the “ethnological” differences in regulatory 
environments for telecommunications and to help to create — 
generally — a more critical distance between “the foreign ex-
ample” and the need to develop an intrinsic policy that absorbs 
the specific cultural needs (but also the temporary fashions) of 
one’s own regulatory environment. In doing so, from a perspec-
tive of historical and institutional observation, this Article ech-
oes conclusions of the authors of another analysis who in con-
trast to this author have chosen a primarily economic and em-
pirical approach. Olivier Boylaud and Giuseppe Nicoletti con-
clude their extensive empirical analysis Regulation, Market 
Structure and Performance in Telecommunications: 
  
 265. Id. at 22. 
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These findings underscore the limits of purely descriptive 
cross-country comparisons of regulation and performance, in-
sofar as they fail to account for economic and policy develop-
ments in different countries, as well as the danger of using 
such analysis for policy purposes without an understanding of 
the different markets and their specific characteristics.266  
In fact, European telecommunications regulation, or at least 
the examples chosen from this area, illustrate how issues ap-
parently manageable mainly by reflections on economic effi-
ciency remain deeply connected and dependent on economic, 
but also on cultural and political developments of the European 
region.  Such phenomenon is due to the complex and specific 
patterns of interaction between European players on the vari-
ous levels provided to them by the specific structure of the EU. 
  
 266. OLIVIER BOYLAUD & GIUSEPPE NICOLETTI, REGULATION , MARKET 
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